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INTRODUCTION
It is axiomatic that corporate directors face a myriad of difficult and
complex decisions that they must make consistently with the fiduciary
duties they owe to the corporation. Delaware courts have developed a
variety of tests to monitor whether directors have remained true to these
duties: the business judgment rule, the enhanced business judgment rule,
Revlon, entire fairness, Blasius, and Schnell. Courts and scholars will
reflexively repeat that under the business judgment rule, judges defer to the
directors’ decision when it was made in compliance with their fiduciary
duties. In contrast, the conventional wisdom is that the other five tests—
the enhanced business judgment rule, Revlon, entire fairness, Blasius, and
Schnell (hereinafter the “five tests”)—require substantial judicial
involvement and scrutiny. Such involvement makes sense, since the
applicability of each test necessarily first required a court to conclude that
the business judgment rule was inapplicable.
This Article contends that the conventional wisdom about the five
tests is an overstatement: While courts state openly that they defer to the
directors’ judgment under the business judgment rule, similar deference,
repackaged, occurs with three of the other five tests as well. In addition,
Delaware courts often utilize three external monitors that offer a high
probability of fairness—independent directors, disinterested shareholder
approval, and the market—to avoid judicial review. Moreover, this Article
contends that courts have created high hurdles for plaintiffs to qualify for
the remaining two tests, so that few cases ever need be decided solely by
judicial review. Thus far, scholars have paid significant attention to when
courts will apply each of these tests1 but have devoted scant attention to the
premises underlying these tests. Transactional and litigation lawyers who
understand what lurks beneath the five tests will thus be better able to plan
for a successful litigation outcome.
Part I of this Article briefly explains the business judgment rule and

*Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University. A.B., Vassar
College, 1972; J.D., Yale University, 1975. The research for this Article was supported by
research funds from the Washington College of Law. The author is indebted to the
invaluable research assistance of Alexander Lutch, J.D. 2012, Washington College of Law,
and Oded Cedar, J.D. 2012, Washington College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Bryan Ford, In Whose Interest: An Examination of the Duties of Directors
and Officers in Control Contests, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 91 (1994) (analyzing when the enhanced
business judgment test will apply); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers
Revlon?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37 (1990) (discussing the role of the Revlon test and its
triggers in the context of Delaware law); David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference
with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 927 (2001) (surveying when courts will apply the Blasius test).
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the five tests. Part II discusses Delaware cases decided under each of the
five tests, showing that while courts overtly state that they review directors’
decisions in all five tests, courts instead typically employ a non-judicial
monitor to avoid such a review in the Unocal, Revlon, and entire fairness
tests. Although no monitor is available for either the Schnell or Blasius
tests, courts have made it quite difficult to invoke either of these tests so
that the instances of judicial review under these tests are almost
nonexistent. Part III discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the external
monitors; readers can therefore evaluate whether corporate case law has
been improved by courts largely bypassing judicial review in favor of these
monitors. Part IV discusses a few notable exceptions to this pattern of
deference and explains how these decisions would have been otherwise
decided using one or more non-judicial monitors.
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SIX TESTS
A. The Business Judgment Rule
Perhaps the most often quoted description of the business judgment
rule is found in Aronson v. Lewis: The rule is “a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company.”2 Plaintiffs must dislodge that
presumption by producing sufficient evidence3 that directors violated their
duty of care or loyalty.4 In Delaware, directors satisfy their duty of care if
they are not grossly negligent,5 and their duty of loyalty requires them to be
both independent6 and disinterested7 (hereinafter collectively referred to as

2. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124
(Del. Ch. 1971)). Unlike the standards contained in the five tests, the business judgment
rule is not a standard of review. Instead, “it is an expression of a policy of non-review of a
board of directors’ decision when a judge has already performed the crucial task of
determining that certain conditions exist.” William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287,
1297 (2000).
3. See Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996) (stating that it is the plaintiff’s
burden under the business judgment rule to rebut the presumption that directors complied
with their fiduciary duties in making a decision); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig.,
669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (“[T]he presumption of the business judgment rule attaches ab
initio and to survive a [motion to dismiss], a plaintiff must allege well-pleaded facts to
overcome the presumption.”).
4. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996) (“Only by demonstrating that
the Board breached its fiduciary duties may the presumption of the business judgment rule
be rebutted.”); State of Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, C.A. No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 42, at *11-12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000) (reasoning that unless the presumption of the
business judgment rule is sufficiently rebutted by the plaintiff creating a “reasonable doubt
about self-interest or independence, the Court must defer to the discretion of the board”);
see also STEPHEN A. RADIN, 1 THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 53-55 (6th ed. 2009) (quoting several Delaware decisions that
explain the burden for a shareholder plaintiff).
5. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (identifying “gross negligence” as
the level of conduct that would “giv[e] rise to a violation of the fiduciary duty of care”);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (establishing gross negligence as the
standard by which boards are liable for violating their duty of care).
6. Aronson v. Lewis defines independence: “Independence means that a director’s
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than
extraneous considerations or influences.” 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984). Delaware courts
have further clarified that in order for a director to be classified as not independent, any
benefit the director gets from a transaction must be both different from the benefit received
by similarly-situated shareholders and material to that director. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d
1120, 1127 (Del. 2010) (holding that if directors receive identical benefits to similarlysituated shareholders, those directors lack independence); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,
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“independent”) and to have acted in good faith.8 By stating that they will
afford heightened deference to decisions made by outside, independent
directors,9 Delaware courts have incentivized corporations to design their
boards with a majority of independent directors or to have interested
directors recuse themselves so that decisions are made by a majority of
independent directors.10
Delaware courts have given several different rationales for the
business judgment rule. One is that “discretion granted directors and
managers allows them to maximize shareholder value in the long term by
taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be held personally

Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1168 (Del. 1995) (holding that a benefit given to a director must be
material); In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., No. 20269, slip op. at 22 (Del. Ch.
May 4, 2005) (holding, also, that a benefit received by a director must be material); see also
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993) (explaining that a plaintiff can show a
lack of independence where directors are so “under [the influence of another] that their
discretion would be sterilized”); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting
that courts apply a subjective “actual person” standard when assessing interestedness and
independence).
7. To be considered disinterested, directors “can neither appear on both sides of a
transaction nor expect to derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of selfdealing, as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all stockholders
generally.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Orman, 794 A.2d at 23 (noting that the
material interest required for a director to be considered interested is judged in relation to
the director’s economic circumstances).
8. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (holding that good faith is a
subset of the duty of loyalty); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
64, 67 (Del. 2006) (defining good faith by giving two, non-exclusive definitions of bad
faith: (i) subjective bad faith, where the fiduciary actually intends to harm the corporation,
and (ii) where a fiduciary acts in conscious disregard of his duties or acts intentionally to
violate the law).
9. See Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 190 (Del. 1988) (“Approval of a transaction
by a majority of independent, disinterested directors almost always bolsters a presumption
that the business judgment rule attaches to transactions approved by a board of directors that
are later attacked on grounds of lack of due care.”); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del.
1986) (reasoning that since ten of the thirteen directors were outside directors, and they
received outside financial and legal advice, their actions constituted a “prima facie showing
of good faith and reasonable investigation”); In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542
A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988) (emphasizing the deference accorded to independent directors in
applying the business judgment rule to an independent committee’s merger negotiations).
10. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987)
(noting that because the two interested directors recused themselves from participating in
the board meetings, thereby leaving the independent directors in the majority, “proof that
the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is materially enhanced”).
Sometimes, a board will create a committee consisting solely of independent directors to
make decisions where a majority of the board is not independent. See, e.g., infra note 273
and accompanying text (discussing board’s creation of an independent committee in Kahn v.
Lynch).

SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

604

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/3/2013 4:15 PM

[Vol. 15:3

liable if the company experiences losses,”11 or if a better deal emerges in
the future.12 Second, the rule encourages qualified individuals to become
directors, as the rule minimizes the chance of personal liability.13 The third
rationale is that courts are ill-equipped to make business judgments.14
Judges are appointed or elected to the bench for a variety of reasons, but
business judgment and expertise need not be prominent criteria for
someone’s ascension to the bench. Instead, shareholders elect directors to
make business judgments on behalf of the corporation, presumably because
candidates for this position have business judgment and expertise.15
Finally, the business judgment rule ensures that directors, not shareholders,
manage the corporation; if directors could easily be held liable,
shareholders might frequently ask for judicial review and thereby intrude
on the board’s decision-making.16 Several of these rationales are embodied
in the following explanation by the Delaware Court of Chancery:

11. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009);
see also id. at 131 (“[I]t is tempting in a case with such staggering losses for one to think
that they could have made the ‘right’ decision if they had been in the directors’ position.
This temptation, however, is one of the reasons for the presumption against an objective
review of business decisions by judges, a presumption that is no less applicable when the
losses to the Company are large.”); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1055
(Del. Ch. 1996) (explaining that the business judgment rule acknowledges that directors will
not take appropriate risks and consequently maximize returns for shareholders if they are
concerned about personal liability from derivative actions).
12. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(discussing when directors can be liable for their decisions and noting that “[t]ime-bound
mortals cannot foresee the future”).
13. See Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 668 (Del. Ch. 2006) (expressing
concern that the business judgment rule’s “utility in encouraging risk-taking and board
service [not] be undermined”); see also RADIN, supra note 4, at 30 (stating that the business
judgment rule encourages more people to become directors).
14. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (“Because courts are ill equipped to engage in post hoc substantive
review of business decisions,” the business judgment rule allows courts to avoid such
review); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(commenting on the need for the business judgment rule in order to avoid “substantive
second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries”).
15. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(“Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information
and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts . . . courts have long been reluctant to
second-guess such decisions when they appear to have been made in good faith.”).
16. Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. L. 461, 470
(1992) (explaining that the business judgment rule is intended to protect the authority of the
board); Michel P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. L. 503, 522
(1989) (“The power to hold to account is the power to interfere and, ultimately, the power to
decide. If stockholders are given too easy access to courts, the effect is to transfer
decisionmaking power from the board to the stockholders . . . .”).
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The business judgment rule serves to protect and promote the
role of the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.
Because courts are ill equipped to engage in post hoc substantive
review of business decisions, the business judgment rule
“operates to preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably
on the business and affairs of a corporation.”17
Therefore, unless the plaintiff can raise sufficient doubt that the rule’s
presumption is inaccurate because a board was disloyal or not sufficiently
careful, the rule “prevents a judge or jury from second guessing director
decisions.”18 As a result, the business judgment rule overwhelmingly
restricts plaintiffs and courts to claims that the process by which the board
made its decision was inconsistent with the board’s fiduciary duties. With
rare exceptions, the rule precludes both plaintiffs and courts from attacking
the board’s decision itself.19
The business judgment rule is powerful not only because it requires
the court to defer to the board’s decision, but also because of the breadth of
the rule’s applicability. It is standard for courts to apply the business
judgment rule to operational issues. For example, in In re Walt Disney Co.

17. Disney, 907 A.2d at 746 (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345,
360 (Del. 1993)); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d at 812 (“Absent an abuse of
discretion, [the board’s] judgment will be respected by the courts.”); Reading Co. v. Trailer
Train Co., C.A. No. 7422, slip op. at 10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 15, 1984) (“The business judgment
rule allows for the possibility that other people might disagree with a board’s decision . . . .
In the context of our corporate business world, courts should be loathe to interfere with the
internal management of corporations or to interfere with their business decisions unless
statutory or case law indicates they have overstepped their bounds.”).
18. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009).
19. There are a few Delaware cases that state that there is a sliver of room to attack the
board’s decision under the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d
695, 705-06 (Del. 2009) (explaining that under the business judgment rule, a court will not
second-guess a board’s decision unless it cannot find any rational basis for the decision);
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating that the board’s
decision under the business judgment rule will stand unless it “can[not] be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”); accord Parnes v. Bally, 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999); see
also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (explaining that “[i]rrationality is the
outer limit of the business judgment rule” and “may tend to show that [a] decision is not
made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business judgment rule”) (citation
omitted); Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique
in Light of the Financial Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010/2011) (reasoning that
although plaintiffs can theoretically challenge the substance of the decision, they are limited
to proving that the directors committed waste, a test “so difficult to satisfy that many
commentators describe it as a judicial refusal to evaluate the substantive merits of a board’s
decision at all”); Allen et al., supra note 2, at 1298 (noting that if the conditions of the
business judgment rule are satisfied, “it is as a practical matter impossible that the resulting
decision can be found irrational”).
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Derivative Litigation,20 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business
judgment rule applied to a board’s compensation decisions surrounding the
hiring of the corporation’s president.21 Despite a suit by Disney
shareholders claiming that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by
agreeing to the president’s compensation package and highly lucrative
severance package, the court applied the business judgment rule to the
directors’ decisions. Similarly, in Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana,
Inc.,22 the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery’s finding
that the board’s decision to issue additional stock was covered by the
business judgment rule despite claims that the issuance was designed to
dilute the power of certain shareholders.23
Courts, however, have not limited the business judgment rule only to
operational issues; courts have also applied the rule to organic changes.
For example, in Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.,24 the Delaware
Supreme Court applied the business judgment rule to the Time board’s
original decision to enter into a merger agreement with Warner Brothers.
In reviewing the shareholders’ challenge to the board’s conduct,25 the
Delaware Supreme Court stated:
We begin by noting, as did the Chancellor, that our decision does
not require us to pass on the wisdom of the board’s decision to
enter into the original Time-Warner agreement. That is not a
court’s task. Our task is simply to review the record to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the Chancellor’s
conclusion that the initial Time-Warner agreement was the
product of a proper exercise of business judgment . . . . [T]he
Time board’s decision . . . was entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule.26
In addition to applying the business judgment rule both to operational
20. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
21. Id. at 58.
22. 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006).
23. Id. at 121–22.
24. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); accord Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del.
1985) (applying the business judgment rule to board’s decision to enter into a third-party
merger agreement, but finding that the board violated the rule); Van de Walle v. Unimation,
Inc., No. 7046, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, at *31 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991) (holding that the
merger should be reviewed under the business judgment rule because “in substance and in
form the merger was a bona fide arm’s-length transaction negotiated with a third party”).
25. While the court made clear that the business judgment rule governed the Time
board’s initial merger decision, 571 A.2d at 1142, most of the case involved a challenge to
the board’s conduct subsequent to the board’s initial decision, after Paramount Corporation
offered Time shareholders a substantially better deal than they would receive in the
proposed Time-Warner merger. See id. at 1149-55.
26. Id. at 1151-52 (citations omitted).
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issues as well as to organic changes, Delaware courts have held that the
rule can govern even particularly sensitive issues. One example involved
board conduct that had the effect of overturning the results of the
shareholders’ vote on the election of directors. Although Delaware courts
have made clear that they will zealously safeguard shareholder voting
rights against board attempts to eviscerate those rights,27 the Delaware
Supreme Court in City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System v.
Alexis Technologies, Inc.28 held, in an en banc decision, that the business
judgment rule would apply to the board’s decision to enact a policy that
instituted majority voting for the election of directors, but gave the board
the power to refuse the resignation of any candidate who failed to garner
the requisite number of votes.29 The board then exercised that selfempowered discretion to reject the resignation of the candidates who did
not garner majority support from the shareholders.30 Although the plaintiff
charged that a standard higher than the business judgment rule should
apply, either because the case involved shareholder voting rights or because
the allegedly independent directors were merely protecting their
colleagues,31 the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment
rule was the proper governing standard of review.32
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court has given the business judgment
rule a wide reach. Delaware courts have applied the business judgment
rule to monitor transactions spanning from routine to organic changes, as
well as decisions that are both difficult and politically charged. The wide
applicability of the business judgment rule thereby generates a plethora of
decisions in which the court will defer to the directors’ business judgment
27. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (striking down
defensive measure that increased the size of the target’s board because the primary purpose
of this action was to impede the shareholder vote); Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564
A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (invalidating defensive measure of expanding board size because
of its effect of impeding shareholder vote despite finding that directors acted in good faith);
see infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (describing courts’ heightened scrutiny under
the Blasius test as a result of concern for shareholder voting rights).
28. 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (en banc).
29. Specifically, the board enacted a “plurality-plus policy” that (i) required incumbent
board candidates up for re-election to submit a resignation conditioned upon failing to
receive majority support, (ii) required candidates to be elected by majority, rather than a
plurality, of votes, and (iii) gave the board discretionary power to reject or accept
resignations tendered by incumbent directors who failed to receive the requisite support. Id.
at 283.
30. Id. at 285–86.
31. Id. at 286.
32. Id. at 291. While acknowledging that the board’s decision to reject the proffered
resignations had the effect of overriding the shareholder vote, id., the court held that future
shareholders could demand to inspect the corporate books and records to investigate the
suitability of directors to continue in office. Id. at 289.
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as long as plaintiffs are unable to surmount the significant burden of a
prima facie showing that the board breached its fiduciary duties in the
process of making the decision under review. One of the following five
tests will apply only if plaintiff has made such a showing33 or if the court
believes that the board has transcended its powers.34
B. The Enhanced Business Judgment Rule
As noted above, the business judgment rule does not apply if the board
is not disinterested and independent.35 Thus, once the Delaware Supreme
Court accepted target shareholders’ claims that hostile tender offers create
inherent conflicts for target directors,36 the court could not apply the
business judgment rule to monitor directors’ responses to such offers. The
Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,37
however, bypassed its traditional conflict monitor, the entire fairness test,38
33. See, e.g., Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) (stating that entire
fairness “becomes an issue only if the presumption of the business judgment rule is
defeated”); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del.
1986) (“No such defensive measure can be sustained when it represents a breach of the
directors’ fundamental duty of care . . . . In that context the board’s action is not entitled to
the deference accorded it by the business judgment rule.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”).
34. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988), Mentor Graphics
Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998), and Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003) are all cases where at least part of the
holding was that the board exceeded its powers. See infra notes 78, 236 and accompanying
text.
35. See supra notes 4–8.
36. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (conceding that that there was “the omnipresent
specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the
corporation and its shareholders”); see also Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate
Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 324–25 (1987)
(arguing that target directors may be motivated to reject an offer because of fear of losing
their job and the accompanying power, prestige, and financial rewards).
37. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
38. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (noting that if a plaintiff rebuts the business judgment rule
presumption, the burden shifts to the directors to show entire fairness); Kahn v. Roberts,
1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995) (explaining that, in an
interested director transaction, “courts generally will bypass the business judgment rule and
conduct an entire fairness analysis on the challenged transaction”); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI &
JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS § 4.19B at 4-172 (2011 supp.) (“If the business judgment rule’s
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and instead created a new standard, which it named the “enhanced business
judgment rule,” to monitor decisions by target directors to enact defensive
tactics when faced with a hostile takeover.39 Characterizing this new test as
an intermediate standard of review,40 the Delaware Supreme Court
explained:
[T]he omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial
examination at the threshold before the protections of the
business judgment rule may be conferred.41
Unlike the business judgment rule, which places the initial burden of
proof on plaintiffs, this newly-created test requires the target board to bear
the burden of showing first, that it acted with “good faith and reasonable
investigation” by demonstrating that it had reasonable grounds to believe
that the takeover posed a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness,42
and second, that the defensive measure it chose was “reasonable in relation
to the threat posed.”43 This second step must be neither coercive nor
preclusive,44 and the shareholders’ option to vote their directors out of
office must remain viable.45 The Unocal test purports to lack the deference
to the directors’ judgment embodied in the business judgment rule because
Unocal places the burden of proof on the board to show that it both

presumption is rebutted, the burden shifts to the defendant directors to show the ‘entire
fairness’ of the transaction.”).
39. See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 38, § 4.20[A] at 4-186 (“Unocal applies in
change-of-control contexts when a board takes some action that alters, manages, or deters
the threatened change of control.”).
40. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997)
(noting in the Revlon context that enhanced business judgment is an “intermediate level of
judicial review”).
41. Unocal at 954 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 955.
43. Id. If the board meets the Unocal test, the burden switches to the plaintiff to show
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the directors’ decisions were primarily based on
perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud,
overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed.” Id. at 958.
44. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (describing
measures that are either coercive or preclusive as draconian).
45. See id. at 1388-89 (requiring proxy contest to remain viable in order for defensive
tactic to avoid being preclusive); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 959 (“If the stockholders are
displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P.
v. Riggio, C.A. No. 5465-VCS, slip op. at 45 n. 182 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2010) (explaining
that the defensive tactic must leave an insurgent with a “fair chance for victory,” rather than
a “slight possibility of victory” in order for the defensive tactic to avoid being classified as
preclusive).
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conducted a reasonable process and chose a defensive tactic that is not
preclusive, coercive or unreasonable. Thus, there is “judicial examination
at the threshold” of the board’s process as well as its decision, thereby
providing both a subjective and an objective review of the defensive
tactic.46
C. Revlon
Similarly, Delaware courts have chosen to apply enhanced business
judgment47 when a corporation is in the “Revlon mode,” a designation the
court created in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.48 In
Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that if the corporation is in the
Revlon mode, the board’s duty changes from the preservation of the
corporation to the “maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the
stockholders’ benefit.”49 Since the board must focus solely on maximizing
value for its shareholders, it may no longer consider the interests of
“other . . . constituencies.”50 Moreover, because “[m]arket forces must be
allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s shareholders the best price
available for their equity,”51 a board’s use of covenants that interfere with
the market will be suspect.52
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated the Revlon board’s

46. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813,
830 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Enhanced scrutiny has both subjective and objective components.”);
Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2011) (stating
that the Unocal test requires an examination of both the process used to identify the threat
and the reasonableness of the resulting decision); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that
directors could use a rights plan improperly, even when acting subjectively in good faith,
Unocal and its progeny require that this Court also review the use of a rights plan
objectively.”); see also Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review in
Conflict Transactions on Motions to Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past Decade, 36 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 967, 973–74 (2011) (stating that enhanced scrutiny has subjective and objective
components).
47. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988) (noting
that courts will apply enhanced scrutiny when a corporation is in the Revlon mode).
48. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
49. Id. at 182; see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (“In the sale of
control context, the directors must focus on one primary objective—to secure the transaction
offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders—and they must exercise
their fiduciary duties to further that end.”).
50. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
51. Id. at 184.
52. Id. at 183-84.
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decision to grant a lock-up, cancellation fee, and a no-shop provision to its
white knight in the face of a competing bidder because these covenants
hindered, rather than promoted, competitive bidding for the target.53 The
Delaware Supreme Court warned future boards that although covenants are
not illegal when a corporation is in the Revlon mode,54 covenants are highly
disfavored because they normally deter, rather than spur, competitive
bidding.55 While reserving the option to add additional categories to its list
of Revlon “triggers,”56 only a few fact patterns currently trigger Revlon
review.57

53. Id. at 184. A lock-up is an option to buy shares or assets of the target company.
Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target
Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 341 n.87 (1987). A cancellation fee provides liquidated
damages to the bidder in the event the acquisition fails to close. Id. at 341 n.88. A no-shop
provision prevents the target from seeking or negotiating with another bidder. Id. at 341
n.89. A “white knight” is a friendly acquirer sought by the target company in response to a
hostile bidder’s tender offer. Id. at 341 n.90.
54. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183.
55. Id.; see also Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re Paramount
Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig.), 637 A.2d at 49 (Del. 1994) (holding that a no-shop
provision impermissibly interfered with the directors’ ability to negotiate with another
known bidder when the corporation was in the Revlon mode); Rand v. W. Airlines, Inc.,
C.A. No. 8632, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 118, at *10 (Del. Ch. Sept. 11, 1989) (warning that
the only auction-ending devices that are permissible when the corporation is in a Revlon
mode are those that “confer a substantial benefit upon the stockholders”).
56. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP 2011 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 79, at *45 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has determined
that a board might find itself faced with [a Revlon] duty in at least three scenarios . . . .”).
57. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995) (listing
the following transactions that will put the corporation in a Revlon mode: “(1) when a
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company; (2) where, in response to a
bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction
involving the break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction results in a
sale or change of control”) (quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270,
1290 (Del. 1994)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Since the Delaware
Supreme Court has yet to draw a clear line for when Revlon review would apply to a mixed
cash and stock transaction, Delaware courts are working their way through these fact
patterns. See id. at 70-71 (holding that thirty-three percent cash did not trigger Revlon
duties); In re Smurfit-Stone, 2011 Del Ch. LEXIS 79, at *60 (holding that a merger in
which target shareholders would receive half cash, half stock, and ownership of forty-five
percent of the combined company, is in in a Revlon mode); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders
Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757
A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (suggesting that a merger that provided sixty-two percent of the
consideration to target shareholders in cash would be in a Revlon mode). Cf. In re Synthes,
Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1047-48 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that no change of
control occurred so as to trip Revlon duties where sixty-five percent of the purchase price
was paid with the purchaser’s publicly-traded stock, making it impossible for the purchaser
to have a controlling shareholder); In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 361-VCN,
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Delaware courts occasionally bristle, however, at the inference that
there are special Revlon duties, as they view the directors’ obligations in
Revlon simply as an extension of their fundamental fiduciary duties.58
Thus, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained that, in a Revlon
transaction, the court:
adopts an intermediate level of judicial review which recognizes
the broad power of the board to make decisions in the process of
negotiating and recommending a “sale of control” transaction, so
long as the board is informed, motivated by good faith desire to
achieve the best available transaction, and proceeds
“reasonably[.]”59
Since courts will review a board’s compliance with its Revlon duties under
the enhanced business judgment rule, directors bear the burden of proving
their compliance with their required duties.60 As such, courts purport not to
defer to the board’s judgment under Revlon.
D. Entire Fairness
As noted above,61 since the business judgment rule requires directors
to be disinterested, a finding of self-interest makes the business judgment
rule inapplicable. In situations involving a conflict of interest, courts

3835-VCN, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5-7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2009) (dismissing shareholder
challenge to merger and finding transaction adequate that offered shareholders thirty-six
percent cash at the time of the merger, and forty-four percent cash at the closing of the
merger, but declining to rule squarely on whether the corporation was in a Revlon mode).
58. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994)
(describing “Revlon duties” as “colloquial[]” and “inappropriate[]”); Barkan v. Amsted
Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) (stating that Revlon duties mean simply that
“directors must act in accordance with their fundamental duties of care and loyalty”).
59. Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997).
60. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994) (“[I]n the review of a transaction involving a sale of a company, the
directors have the burden of establishing that the price offered was the highest value
reasonably available under the circumstances.”); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (noting that when a court applies enhanced business
judgment, the board bears the burden of proof); see also supra text accompanying notes 42–
43 (explaining that the burden of proof is on the board of directors).
61. See supra notes 4, 6–8 and accompanying text (defining independence and its
relationship to the duty of loyalty); see also Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp.,
569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (“The burden falls upon the proponent of a claim to rebut the
presumption [of the business judgment rule] by introducing evidence either of director selfinterest, if not self-dealing, or that the directors either lacked good faith or failed to exercise
due care.”).
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typically utilize the entire fairness test.62 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,63 a case
involving a controlling-shareholder cash-out merger, provides, perhaps, the
most often cited description of the entire fairness test. In Weinberger, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that since the controlling shareholder
controlled both sides of the merger, the target corporation was required to
prove the entire fairness of the transaction.64 The court explained that its
examination would be thorough, encompassing a review of every feature of
the board’s conduct to determine whether it had engaged in fair dealing and
had offered a fair price,65 but warned that “[a]ll aspects of the issue must be
examined as a whole since the question is one of entire fairness.”66 Thus,
Weinberger put defendants on notice that they bear the burden of proving
any factor that the court considers probative of the transaction’s fairness.67
Following Weinberger, Delaware courts have repeatedly warned that
the entire fairness test requires a court to conduct a searching and pervasive
inquiry.68 In fact, given the difficulty of the test, some judges consider the
decision to apply the entire fairness test to be almost outcome
determinative.69 As such, the entire fairness test is the epitome of judicial

62. See supra note 38 (establishing that the entire fairness test is the usual test applied
when directors are not disinterested).
63. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
64. Id. at 710.
65. The Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger defined fair dealing as involving
“questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated,
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were
obtained,” and fair price “relates to the economic and financial considerations” of the
transaction. Id. at 711.
66. Id.; Lonergan v. EPE Holdings LLC, 5 A.3d 1008, 1020 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[A]
Delaware Court ‘determines entire fairness based on all aspects of the entire transaction.’”)
(quoting Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 746 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
67. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (Del. 1983) (“The requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the
burden of establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the
courts.”).
68. See, e.g., In re Digex, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(noting the “careful scrutiny” required under entire fairness review); Linton v. Everett, No.
15219, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (holding that issuance by
directors of shares to themselves did not satisfy the “rigorous standard” of entire fairness);
see also 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 4-172, § 4.19[B][A] (Supp. 2012) (describing
the “heavy burden” of showing entire fairness); RADIN, supra note 4, at 65 (noting that the
“fairness requirement entails ‘exacting scrutiny to determine whether the transaction is
entirely fair to the stockholders’”) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network
Inc. (In re Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994)).
69. Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Entire
fairness is Delaware’s most onerous standard.”); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1371 (Del. 1995) (noting that the standard of review under which directors’ actions
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review.
E. Blasius
Unlike the previous three tests, the Blasius test—created in Blasius
Industries v. Atlas Corporation70 and affirmed by the Delaware Supreme
Court in MM Cos. v. Liquid Auto71—is tripped by a board’s improper
purpose. This doctrine states that if the plaintiff establishes that the board
acted for the primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of the shareholder
vote for the election of directors, the board must demonstrate a compelling
justification for its actions.72 In Blasius, the board attempted to thwart the
shareholder vote by expanding the number of directors, which had the
effect of preventing insurgents from gaining control of the board.73
Although finding that the board had acted with good faith and care, and
that the directors had good cause to be concerned about the insurgent’s plan
to take over the corporation, the Court of Chancery nevertheless found that
the board had acted primarily to thwart the exercise of the shareholder
vote.74 Since the board could offer no compelling purpose for its actions,
the court held that the directors had committed an “unintended violation of
the duty of loyalty” and had acted outside the scope of their authority.75
are evaluated is generally outcome determinative given the strength of the business
judgment rule presumption and the scrutiny employed under the entire fairness standard);
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(“Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment rule is so powerful
and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard
of judicial review frequently is determinative of the outcome of derivative litigation.”).
There are, of course, some cases in which defendants have proven the entire fairness of their
decision. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (holding that the board
met its burden of proving its decision to have corporation repurchase stock of employeeshareholders, but not of non-employee shareholders, to be entirely fair).
70. 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
71. 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003).
72. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661–62; see also, In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 20269, slip op. at 32 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005), aff’d, 897 A.2d 162 (Del. 2006)
(holding that the plaintiff has two burdens under Blasius: showing the board’s primary
purpose and the thwarting of the franchise); Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 352 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 884 A.2d 512 (Del. 2005) (holding that the plaintiff must show both elements
under Blasius).
73. 564 A.2d at 657–58. Blasius sought to enjoin the Atlas board’s decision to add two
new directors to its seven-member board. Id. at 652. Blasius claimed that the Atlas board
expanded its membership in order to thwart Blasius’ efforts to gain control of the board. Id.
at 657–58.
74. Id. at 663.
75. Id. (“A majority of the shareholders . . . could view the matter differently than did
the board. If they do, or did, they are entitled to . . . advance that view. They are also
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The Court of Chancery’s analysis in Blasius exposes the
uncompromising nature of the compelling purpose requirement. The court
first considered whether such board conduct should be per se illegal.76
Instead, the Delaware Chancery Court settled for a slightly lesser standard
and held that the board must demonstrate a compelling reason for its
actions. The mere fact that the court considered making such board
conduct per se illegal, however, highlights the skepticism with which the
court will consider a board’s proffered reason for its actions. Moreover,
the court held that the board’s good faith and due care are irrelevant in the
analysis of whether they had a compelling justification for their conduct.77
Similarly, the court’s logic for creating the Blasius test provides
further evidence that judicial review under this test will be demanding. The
court held that the board should not be able to monitor whom the
shareholders elect to the board as the power to elect directors is outside of
the province of the board’s power.78 Moreover, the court reasoned that the
integrity of the shareholder vote merited special consideration because that
vote legitimizes director control over corporate power.79 Both of these
reasons provide justification for courts to scrutinize the board’s behavior
carefully in order to keep the board from encroaching on the shareholders’
domain.
The trigger for applying the Blasius doctrine explains why courts will
not defer to directors under this test: Any board that acts primarily to
thwart the vote of its shareholders is itself acting outside the scope of its
powers. Such claims of board overreaching would not permit courts, by
definition, to defer to the board. Moreover, only courts can evaluate
whether a board has offered a compelling justification for its conduct.
F. Schnell
The final test, the Schnell doctrine, is the antithesis of the business
judgment rule because the doctrine permits courts to invalidate a board’s
decision without first faulting the board’s decision-making. In Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,80 corporate directors moved the date and

entitled . . . to restrain . . . the board, from acting for the principal purpose of thwarting that
action.”).
76. Id. at 662.
77. Id. at 660–61; see also In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674
(Del. Ch. 2004) (noting that under Blasius, a board’s good faith is irrelevant).
78. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
79. Id.
80. 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
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location of the corporation’s annual meeting in an effort to thwart insurgent
shareholders’ proxy fight.81 Although the Delaware Chancery Court upheld
the board’s conduct as being in full compliance with the statute and the
corporation’s charter,82 the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, articulating
what became known as the “Schnell doctrine”: “[I]nequitable action does
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.”83 The
Delaware Supreme Court found the board’s conduct was inequitable
because the directors purposefully manipulated the electoral machinery so
as to entrench themselves in power.84 As such, the court held that the
board’s conduct was per se illegal. Most,85 but not all,86 cases where the
court has applied this doctrine have involved board attempts to frustrate the
shareholder vote.
Thus, applicability of the Schnell doctrine requires a court to conclude
that although the board acted legally, its decision was inequitable. Both
components of this test make it impossible for a judge to defer to the board:
Only a judge can determine if a board has acted legally, and only a judge
can exercise a court’s equitable powers to invalidate inequitable conduct.
G. Summary
In sum, Delaware courts have stated that judicial deference is
warranted only under the business judgment rule and have also created the
impression that the other five tests require extensive judicial review. The
courts have created this impression by placing the burden on the board to

81. Chris-Craft’s directors moved the meeting date from January 11, 1972, to
December 8, 1971, thereby giving the insurgents less time to prepare and solicit proxies, and
moved the location of the meeting to Cortland, New York in hopes that this location would
be inconvenient and thus would deter shareholders from attending the meeting. Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 430, 432–34 (Del. Ch. 1971), rev’d, 285 A.2d 437 (Del.
1971).
82. Id. at 437.
83. Id. at 439.
84. Id.
85. Since Schnell was decided, only thirteen other cases have been decided using this
doctrine. Of these thirteen cases, eleven relate to a voting issue. See infra note 191 (listing
all 13 cases).
86. The two cases that did not relate to shareholder voting were Hollinger Int’l v.
Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080–81 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing Frantz Manufacturing Co. v. EAC
Industries, 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) to show that Schnell is applicable to bylaw
amendments and then striking down bylaw amendments as inequitable) and Seagraves v.
Urstadt Property Co., C.A. No. 10307, 1989 Del Ch. LEXIS 155 (Del. Ch. Nov. 13, 1989)
(refusing to dismiss a complaint regarding delisting of shares and nonpayment of dividends
because of the potential for equitable relief under Schnell).
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prove to the court’s satisfaction the respective requirements of the Unocal,
Revlon, and entire fairness tests. Similarly, only courts can determine if
boards trigger and ultimately pass the requirements of Blasius and Schnell.
As a result, Delaware courts have implied that they often review board
decisions. As Part II of this Article delineates, however, there is more
lurking behind these five tests than is superficially apparent.
II. PEELING BACK THE TESTS
A. Enhanced Business Judgment: Unocal
Pursuant to the enhanced business judgment test, the board loses its
presumption of propriety and instead bears the burden of convincing the
court that the directors have fulfilled their fiduciary duties both in
identifying and in their reaction to their perceived threat to corporate
policy. As noted above,87 the court professes to examine both the board’s
process and its decision under this enhanced test. Underneath this veneer
of judicial review, however, is convincing evidence that Delaware courts,
in reality, heavily defer to the decision of the target directors.
The most obvious evidence that Delaware courts normally defer to the
board under the enhanced business judgment rule is that the Delaware
Supreme Court explicitly said that it would be particularly inclined to defer
to the directors’ decision to employ defensive tactics if a majority of
independent directors made the decision.88 The Court of Chancery recently
explained the logic of diluting the board’s burden if the decision was made
by a majority of independent directors:
Under Unocal, where the defensive actions were taken by “a

87. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
88. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citations
omitted) (“In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of
another person’s stock ownership. However, they satisfy that burden ‘by showing good
faith and reasonable investigation . . . .’ Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as
here, by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of outside independent directors
who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.”); see also Paramount
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989) (“The evidence supporting
this finding is materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of Time’s sixteen board members
were outside independent directors.”); cf. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177, n.3 (rejecting the idea of
deferring to the board because a majority of directors lacked independence); Grand Metro.,
PLC v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“If a majority of the board
consisted of ‘outside, independent directors,’ their ‘proof’ as to the Unocal requirements . . .
is ‘materially enhanced.’”); see infra note 113.
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majority of outside independent directors,” proof of the board’s
good faith and reasonable investigation is “materially enhanced.”
Furthermore, the presence of a majority of outside directors,
coupled with a showing of reliance on advice by legal and
financial advisors, “constitutes a prima facie showing of good
faith and reasonable investigation.” . . . The rationale behind
materially enhancing the proof of good faith and reasonableness
of those decisions made by a majority of outside independent
directors is directly related to the primary concern that enhanced
scrutiny under Unocal is designed to address: that a board might
adopt defensive measures simply to retain control, whether or not
those measures are in the best interest of shareholders. Where
decisions are made by outside independent directors instead of
members of management who have a presumptive desire to retain
their employment, the concern that the board’s decisions are
tainted by self-serving motives is mitigated, and there naturally
follows a greater presumption of good faith and reasonable
investigation. This is the essence of the material enhancement
rubric in Unocal and its progeny.89
More subtle evidence that Delaware courts applying the enhanced business
judgment test are more deferential to a board than they admit exists as well.
The first bit of evidence is that the Delaware Supreme Court chose to
create a new test rather than dip into its existing arsenal of tests to monitor
this conflict of interest. In other words, having accepted shareholder
contentions that the business judgment rule was inapplicable because
directors faced a conflict of interest, the court could have resorted to its
traditional monitor for conflict issues, namely, the entire fairness test.90 In
the context of defensive tactics, the entire fairness test would require the
court to analyze whether it was fair for the board to engage in a defensive
tactic regardless of whether the process surrounding the employment of the
tactic was, itself, fair. As Professor Gilson persuasively argued:
Applying a fairness standard to this decision, however, requires a
court to determine whether it was “fair” for control to remain
with management rather than shift to the offeror. And this
inquiry must necessarily focus on whether the shareholders
would be better off with existing management or by selling their
shares.91
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal shied away from
89. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS
39, at *43-44, *50-51 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2010), aff’d, 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010).
90. See supra note 38, 64 and accompanying text.
91. Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 827 (1981).
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requiring target directors to prove that their conduct was entirely fair, as
that test would have required the court to evaluate the management of both
the target and the offeror to determine whether the target board’s decision
to employ any defensive tactic was merited. Instead, the Delaware
Supreme Court created a new test, the enhanced business judgment rule,
with a completely different focus from the entire fairness test. Instead of
bearing the enormous burden of proving that it was fair for them to engage
in defensive tactics because they had a better plan than did the offeror,
target directors under this newly-created test must prove merely that they
complied with their fiduciary duties.92
Second, while conceding that directors have a conflict of interest, the
court nevertheless crafted in Unocal a test that is exceedingly deferential to
directors. Although forty-seven cases have been decided under Unocal,93

92. The first prong of Unocal requires the board to show good faith and reasonable
investigation to identify the threat to corporate policy, which requires care and good faith.
The second prong of Unocal requires the board to respond proportionately to the threat
posed, and to do so with due care. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 53, at 330–37 (1987)
(describing the two prongs of the Unocal test).
93. These forty-seven cases are: Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586
(Del. 2010); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); In re Santa
Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59 (Del. 1995); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In
re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1990); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d
531 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Frantz Mfg.
Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16
A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442 (Del. Ch. 2011);
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Dollar Thrifty
S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio,
1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010); Perlegos v. Atmel Corp., C.A. Nos. 2320-N, 2321-N, 2007 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2007); Black v. Hollinger Int’l Inc., 872 A.2d 559 (Del. Ch.
2005); Orman v. Cullman, C.A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20,
2004); Aquila, Inc. v. Quanta Servs., 805 A.2d 196 (Del. Ch. 2002); Hills Stores Co. v.
Bozic, 769 A.2d 88 (Del. Ch. 2000); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch.
2000); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re
Lukens Inc., S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999); NiSource Capital Mkts., Inc. v.
Columbia Energy Grp., C.A. No. 17341, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 198 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24,
1999); In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., C.A. No. 14713, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94
(Del. Ch. May 24, 1999); Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998); H.F.
Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., Civil Action No. 15650, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 84
(Del. Ch. June 3, 1997); Wells Fargo & Co. v. First Interstate Bancorp., C.A. No. 14623,
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1996); Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483
(Del. Ch. 1995); Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig.), 642 A.2d 792
(Del. Ch. 1993); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., C. A. Nos. 9536, 9561, 1991 Del. Ch.
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only one has failed Unocal’s first step,94 and only nine have failed Unocal’s
second step,95 producing a total failure rate of only twenty-one percent,96 or
LEXIS 134 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1991); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch.
1990); Tomczk v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., C.A. No. 7861, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 47 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 5, 1990); In re DeSoto, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb 5, 1990); In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., 564 A.2d 342
(Del. Ch. 1989); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989);
Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd., 558 A.2d 1049; City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch.
1988); Henley Grp. Inc. v. Santa Fe S. Pac. Corp., C.A. No. 9569, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 32
(Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del.
Ch. 1987); Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 9173, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 474
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987); AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton, & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del. Ch. 1986); MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del.
Ch. 1985). Cf. Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (invalidating defensive tactic under Unocal), aff’d on other grounds, 721 A.2d
1281 (Del. 1998); Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(suggesting that Unocal would be a better structure than Blasius for reviewing case).
94. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d 1.
95. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (finding that the lack of a fiduciary out
impermissibly locked up the deal, making the defensive measures preclusive and coercive,
and therefore, a violation of Unocal); In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59
(finding the use of a poison pill in a discriminatory manner and authorizing a repurchase
program were unreasonable responses in relation to the threat posed, and therefore a
violation of Unocal); Frantz Mfg. Co., 501 A.2d 401 (holding that funding an ESOP in an
unauthorized manner was done with the purpose of perpetuating the board’s control over the
company, and therefore was an unreasonable response that violated Unocal); Chesapeake
Corp., 771 A.2d 293 (finding a violation of Unocal through the use of a supermajority
bylaw, which the court found was a preclusive and unjustified impairment of the
stockholder franchise); Carmody, 723 A.2d 1180 (finding that the board’s unilateral
adoption of a dead hand provision was done for entrenchment purposes, and was a
preclusive and disproportionate defensive response in violation of Unocal); Grand Metro.
Pub. Ltd., 558 A.2d 1049 (concluding the directors’ decision to keep the poison pill in place
was not reasonable in relationship to any threat posed, thereby constituting a violation of
Unocal); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 551 A.2d 787 (finding that the board’s
determination to leave the stock rights in effect was a defensive step that, in the
circumstances of the offer and at the stage of the contest for control, was not a reasonable
response to the threat posed and thus violated Unocal); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc., 552 A.2d
1227 (finding defensive tactic failed Unocal because plaintiffs demonstrated that
restructuring was an unreasonable and disproportionate antitakeover response); AC
Acquisitions Corp, 519 A.2d 103 (stating that it was not reasonable in relation to the threat
to structure an equity option for shareholders that precluded them from accepting the hostile
offer). Three other cases deserve mention: MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118
(Del. 2003), which found that an independent board failed the Blasius test within the Unocal
framework; Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 728 A.2d 25, aff’d on other grounds, 721 A.2d
1281, which found that an otherwise independent board violated Unocal, and while the
Delaware Supreme Court faulted the board’s conduct, the Supreme Court’s holding was on
grounds other than a Unocal violation; and Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc., 552 A.2d 1227, rev’d,
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), which found that a board’s defensive tactic failed Unocal,
whereupon the board abandoned that failed defensive tactic and instituted a different plan,
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a success rate of seventy-nine percent. This seventy-nine percent success
rate is itself revealing of the courts’ deference, given that Unocal requires
the board to bear the burden of proof and whoever has that burden is
supposed to be more likely to lose.97 Moreover, of the thirty-seven cases
that passed Unocal, thirty-one had boards with a majority of independent
directors, two did not, and courts in four cases did not provide this
information.98 Directors’ seventy-nine percent success rate under Unocal
increased to a minimum of eighty-four percent when they had independent
boards.99 These numbers demonstrate that courts engaging in a Unocal
review defer heavily to independent boards.
Further analysis of the ten cases that failed Unocal shows that one of
these cases did not identify the composition of the board,100 five involved
which the Delaware Supreme Court held warranted review under Revlon, not Unocal;
ultimately the board failed the Revlon test.
96. This twenty-one percent failure rate is similar to the results obtained by analyzing
the number of opinions, rather than the number of cases, decided under Unocal. There are
fifty-nine opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery and Supreme Court, and only
eleven of these opinions held that the board violated its Unocal duties—a failure rate of
eighteen percent.
97. See, e.g., Stephen Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the
Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 277 (1988) (contending that
“[w]hichever side . . . ultimately inherits the final burden of proof is likely to lose in any
legal confrontation”); Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empirical Study of the Change
in the Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 61, 66 (2008) (“If
all things are equal in a case, the party who would win is the one who does not have the
burden of proof.”); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 2
(2004) (“[T]he legal endgame is to place the burden of proof on the other side. Whoever
has to prove the unprovable facts is likely to lose.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and
Transcendentalism: You Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 700
(1994) (“If we presume the evidence was damaging to the [defendant], then the
[defendant] . . . is likely to lose. If we place the burden on the other party . . . , then it is
unlikely to be able to meet that burden.”).
98. Of the thirty-seven cases that passed Unocal, Reis and Phillips were the only two
that did not have independent boards. The courts in the following four cases did not identify
whether or not the board was independent: Orman, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 140; NiSource
Capital Mkts, Inc., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 198; Wells Fargo & Co., 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3;
and In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., 564 A.2d 342. The court noted in the
remaining thirty-one cases that the majority of the board was independent. But see Yucaipa
Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P., 1 A.3d at 346 n.214, (refusing to defer to a board with a majority
of independent directors because the board had only a “bare majority of independent
directors” who “never engaged in any separate deliberations” without the other directors and
where some of the advisors to the board were not independent).
99. The minimum success rate of eighty-four percent derives from the fact that while
thirty-one of the thirty-seven cases that passed Unocal had independent boards, courts in
four other cases where boards passed this test did not identify whether the board was
independent. See supra text at note 98 (listing cases in which the board passed the Unocal
test but the court did not identify whether the board was independent).
100. In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59.
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corporations where the majority of directors were not independent,101 and
four were independent.102 Three of these four cases where an independent
board failed its Unocal duties involved boards adopting defensive tactics
that the court found to be draconian,103 and one of these cases resulted from
the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the board’s decision to keep a
poison pill in place in the face of a viable tender offer that posed no threat
to the corporation was unreasonable.104 In other words, these independent
boards engaged in extreme or unreasonable conduct.
This analysis demonstrates that not only are boards highly successful
(seventy-nine percent) under Unocal, but boards consisting of a majority of

101. Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985); eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771
A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787
(Del. Ch. 1988); and AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del. Ch. 1986).
102. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Carmody v.
Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch.
1988). Cf. supra note 93 (discussing Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys. Inc.,
728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998); MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003);
Robert M. Bass Grp. Inc., 552 A.2d 1227).
103. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914; Carmody, 723 A.2d 1180; Robert M. Bass Grp.,
Inc., 552 A.2d 1227. Each of these three cases deserves some explanation. In Bass, the
board abandoned the defensive tactic that failed Unocal, and instituted a different plan,
which the Delaware Supreme Court held warranted review under Revlon, not Unocal; the
board failed the Revlon test. Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc., 552 A.2d 1227. In Carmody, the
chancery court held that a “dead hand” provision is coercive, and therefore draconian, when
it prohibits newly elected directors from implementing a pill. Carmody, 723 A.2d at 1195.
The court reasoned that such a provision makes a proxy contest ‘realistically unattainable.’
Id. In Quickturn, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated a diluted version of the Carmody
pill, namely, a delayed-redemption pill, on grounds that even the diluted version of the
poison pill exceeded the scope of the board’s authority under section 141(a). Quickturn
Design Sys. Inc., 721 A.2d 1281. Finally, it is questionable whether Omnicare should have
even been decided under Unocal, rather than under the business judgment rule. As the
dissent points out, this case should have been decided under the business judgment rule, not
under Unocal, because the merger covenants were not defensive; rather than running from a
hostile tender offer, the target board openly solicited offers, and tied up the one and only
firm offer it received. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS, 818 A.2d at 940-946 (Veasy, J., dissenting);
see also infra note 233 (questioning whether Omnicare should have been decided under
Unocal). Second, the reason that the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court held it was a
violation of the second prong of Unocal was that it is preclusive to lock up a deal without a
fiduciary out. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 918. Although the majority did not label its
holding as a “new rule of law,” the dissent, written by Chief Justice Veasey, characterizes
this requirement for a fiduciary out as a new rule. Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 940–46
(Veasy, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text (expanding upon
the Unocal majority’s requirement of a fiduciary out).
104. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co., 558 A.2d at 1060 (reasoning that the board’s decision
to keep the poison pill in place was preclusive and not proportional to the threat posed).
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independent directors are almost guaranteed to win: Only four independent
boards have failed Unocal. Faced with the choice of making a difficult
decision itself or relying instead on the board—particularly one with a
majority of independent directors—the Delaware Supreme Court has
chosen, in reality, to rely on target directors. Despite professed concern
about the board’s conflict of interest when it faces a hostile tender offer, the
Delaware Supreme Court created a monitor that tacitly lets boards enact all
but the most extreme defensive tactics. Thus, the enhanced business
judgment test leaves a concededly conflicted board in charge of deciding
whether and how to fight the tender offer, limited only by those actions that
a court would classify as preclusive, coercive, or unreasonable. Tellingly,
the Delaware Supreme Court has chided the Court of Chancery for
invalidating defensive tactics that were merely “unnecessary.”105
Before leaving Unocal and the enhanced business judgment test, two
points are worth noting. One is that the Delaware Supreme Court in
Unocal chose to permit target boards to enact defensive tactics, allegedly
under judicial supervision. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, had an
entirely different option, which it rejected: The court could have held that
boards may not enact defensive tactics at all. Such a holding would have
let the market decide the target’s fate by allowing bidders unfettered access
to target shareholders.106 Reliance on the market is, in fact, one monitor the
court subsequently chose for the Revlon test.107
Second, while the court’s main reliance in Unocal was on the
independent directors, the court backstopped that reliance with a safety
valve: The defensive tactic cannot preclude shareholder voting rights, so
that shareholders unhappy with their directors’ defensive tactics can vote
those directors out of office.108 Since all shares, rather than just

105. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d
1361, 1385–86 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc.
S’holders Litig.), C.A. Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187, *32 (Del. Ch. 1994)).
106. In Unocal, had the court precluded boards from engaging in any defensive tactics,
the market would have determined the success or failure of the tender offer. Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1164, 1182–83 (1981) (arguing that,
when faced with a tender offer, shareholder welfare is maximized when management is
passive so that shareholders can decide the sufficiency of the market’s offer); Ronald J.
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 846, 865–67 (1981) (arguing that defensive tactics to
tender offers are inappropriate because they interrupt the target shareholders’ ability to
freely consider whether to hold or sell their stock on the market).
107. See infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon’s requirement
that directors engage the market as a means of assuring a fair transaction price).
108. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (“If the
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of
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disinterested ones, can vote in an election of directors, and since such a
vote will occur after the directors have enacted their defensive tactics, this
vote provides only indirect control over a board’s response to a hostile
tender offer.109
In sum, the enhanced business judgment test, as developed and
applied in Unocal, has been little more than a paper tiger. Delaware courts
have permitted boards—especially independent ones—to enact all but the
most egregious defensive tactics under the veneer of judicial review.
B. Revlon
The Delaware Supreme Court held that if the corporation is in a
“Revlon mode,”110 the court will apply enhanced business judgment111 to
evaluate the board’s efforts to achieve “maximization of the company’s
value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”112 Moreover, as in Unocal,
Delaware courts will afford some degree of deference to a board consisting
of a majority of independent directors.113 Furthermore, just as target

corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”); see also Unitrin, Inc., 651
A.2d at 1388–89 (requiring proxy contest to remain viable in order for a defensive tactic to
avoid being preclusive); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 337
n.182 (Del. Ch. 2010) (explaining that the defensive tactic must leave an insurgent with a
“fair chance for victory,” rather than a “slight possibility of victory,” in order for a defensive
tactic to avoid being preclusive); cf. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693,
698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (reasoning under the business judgment
rule that when directors make poor business decisions, redress must come from the
shareholders, rather than from courts); see also David Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the
Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 303 (2007) (reasoning that wealth is
maximized by directors who know that their decisions will ultimately be reviewed by
investors but not by the courts).
109. In contrast, under the entire fairness test, the vote by the disinterested shares on the
transaction serves to monitor that transaction. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying
text (discussing the Delaware courts’ belief in the efficacy of disinterested share votes as an
external monitor).
110. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing the triggers that will put a
corporation in Revlon mode).
111. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989)
(requiring courts to use enhanced scrutiny when a corporation is in a Revlon mode); see also
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994) (applying
enhanced scrutiny after deciding that the corporation was in a Revlon mode and explaining
the key features of enhanced scrutiny are that the directors have the burden to prove they
were adequately informed and acted reasonably).
112. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985).
113. Id. at 176 n.3 (describing the composition of the Revlon board and stating that the
court “cannot conclude that this board is entitled to certain presumptions that generally
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directors under Unocal can enact a wide variety of defensive tactics, the
Delaware Supreme Court has similarly held that “there is no single
blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties” under Revlon.114
Although courts will review both Unocal and Revlon under the
enhanced business judgment rule and give deference to independent
boards, the goals of Unocal and Revlon within this common standard of
review differ. Unocal is designed to evaluate whether a board, in its effort
to keep its corporation independent, has reasonably identified a threat to
that independence and has enacted defensive tactics within a wide range of
reasonableness. Revlon, in contrast, imposes a specific task on directors:
attempt to maximize shareholder value. Director discretion in Revlon is
broad on how best to achieve that narrow mandate, but the goal is, itself,
limiting and specific. Delaware courts have sought to situate these Revlon
duties within the broader context of the directors’ fiduciary duties, stressing
that once the board convinces the court that it has sought to maximize
shareholder value, the court will defer to the board’s decision:
“[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny should be
deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a
perfect decision. If a board selected one of several reasonable
alternatives, a court should not second-guess that choice even
though it might have decided otherwise or subsequent events may
have cast doubt on the board’s determination.” . . . Thus, where
the board has sought the best value reasonably available for the
shareholders, it will be found to have acted reasonably and as
required by its fiduciary duties.115
attach to the decisions of a board whose majority consists of truly outside independent
directors”); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 58 (George
Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 159, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=801308 (reasoning that
Delaware courts “repeatedly made clear the almost sanitizing effect that a majorityindependent board . . . would have on corporate behavior in transactions involving conflicts
of interest”).
114. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); accord, Lyondell
Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (stating that no court can tell directors
how to maximize price for shareholders because each corporation faces a “unique
combination of circumstances”); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171,
192 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Our case law recognizes that [there] are a variety of sales approaches
that might be reasonable, given the circumstances facing particular corporations.”).
115. Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, C.A. No. 16301, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *42
(Del. Ch. 1998) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc., 637 A.2d at 45); see also In re Lear
Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 115 (Del. Ch. 2007) (reasoning that when in the Revlon
mode, “[b]ecause there can be several reasoned ways to try to maximize value, the court
cannot find fault so long as the directors chose a reasoned course of action”); In re J.P.
Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 783 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that since
“reasonable directors, exercising honest, informed judgment, might differ as to what course
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Thus, Delaware courts have stressed that directors must act to try to
maximize shareholder value, but boards will not be liable either for
differences of opinion of what is the best price116 or for failing to foresee
that a better bid would emerge in the future. After commenting that courts
must review the board’s compliance with its fiduciary duties and the
board’s efforts to promote shareholder interests, the Delaware Chancery
Court in In re Fort Howard Shareholders Litigation stated that “the validity
of the agreement itself cannot be made to turn upon how accurately the
board did foresee the future.”117
In addition to the different goals of Unocal and Revlon, Revlon’s
admonition that boards may use covenants only in their effort to achieve
maximum shareholder value118 highlights another difference from Unocal:
Revlon relies on the market to monitor directors’ compliance with their
Revlon duties. As the court in Revlon stated, “directors cannot fulfill their
enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the contending factions.
Market forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s
shareholders the best price available for their equity.”119 The teachings
from all of the Delaware Revlon decisions require boards to engage the

of action would most likely maximize shareholder interests,” the court will defer to the
expertise of the directors).
116. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011)
(“Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future. The test therefore cannot be whether, with
hindsight, the directors actually achieved the best price.”); In re J.P. Stevens S’holders Litig.
at 781 n.6 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that obtaining the best possible transaction for the
shareholders “does not mean that material factors other than ‘price’ ought not to be
considered and, where appropriate, acted upon by the board. Such factors might include
form of consideration, timing of the transaction or risk of non-consummation”); Golden
Cycle LLC, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *49-51 (applying the rationale from In re J.P.
Stevens and determining that the decision to accept a merger bid that was $.50 less than a
second bid was defensible under Revlon as the higher bid was conditional and would trip a
termination fee and reimbursement provisions of the deal with the other corporation).
117. C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *41 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); see
Golden Cycle, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237, at *49 (approving deal at $19.50 over subsequent
deal at $20 because deal at $19.50 was the highest-price deal at time of board’s decision);
see also infra notes 124–26 (noting that Delaware courts expect boards to comply with their
fiduciary duties but do not expect boards to be clairvoyant).
118. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1989)
(reiterating Revlon lesson that covenants are not illegal per se but recognizing that since
covenants foreclose further bidding, they are illegal unless they generate a substantial
benefit to target shareholders); In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig, C.A. No. 10350,
1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding the target board failed its Revlon duties
when it precluded an auction by granting a lock up, termination fee, and reimbursement
provision to one bidder without notifying the second bidder that the board, contrary to its
previous position, decided to sell the corporation); see also Revlon discussion supra notes
51–55.
119. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
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market in ways most relevant to their corporation; when boards so act,
courts can comfortably defer to the resulting transaction price.120 Thus,
while corporations are not necessarily required to “shop” the company,
Delaware courts have been skeptical of those cases where there is no
market information on the best price for target stock.121 For example, in
Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court warned:
When the board is considering a single offer and has no reliable
grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for
fairness demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher
bids may be elicited. When, however, the directors possess a
body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a
transaction, they may approve that transaction without
conducting an active survey of the market . . . [but] the
circumstances in which this passive approach is acceptable are
limited. “A decent respect for reality forces one to admit that . . .
advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale substitute
for the dependable information that a canvas of the relevant
market can provide.”122
Therefore, when boards and their financial advisors actively canvas
the market, they sustain their burden of proving that they were sufficiently

120. See, e.g., In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(reviewing steps the board took to assess the market and concluded that since the board’s
“approach was a reasonable one, that was the product of considerable deliberation,” the
court would defer to the board’s judgment); see also, Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970
A.2d 235, 242 (Del. 2009) (faulting for its good faith analysis, but not faulting the Court of
Chancery for its view that when corporations are in a Revlon mode, boards “must confirm
that they have obtained the best available price either by conducting an auction, by
conducting a market check, or by demonstrating ‘an impeccable knowledge of the market’”)
(citing Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *19
(Del Ch. July 29, 2008); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198
(Del. Ch. 2007) (rejecting the board’s “excuse for the lack of any attempt at canvassing the
strategic market”); McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1033-1034 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d,
873 A.2d 1099 (Del. 2005) (reasoning that because a merger agreement was preceded by an
active canvassing of the market with the help of its financial advisors, the board sustained its
burden that the directors were sufficiently informed about the adequacy of the transaction
price).
121. McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d at 1033 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff’d, 873 A.2d 1099 (Del.
2005) (explaining that when there is no market check, the court’s analysis will include a
review of the information on which the board based its decision and the reasonableness of
the directors’ conduct); In re Desoto, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990
Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. 1990) (faulting management which “made no effort to canvas
the market to learn if there were other possible suitors or even to preliminarily learn of a
canvas of the market would be worthwhile”).
122. 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (second alteration in original) (internal citations
omitted).
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informed about the adequacy of the transaction price.123 Thus, in Barkan,
the Delaware Supreme Court held that a board that had put the company in
play and had redeemed its poison pill five weeks before the MBO deal
closed, satisfied its Revlon duties, reasoning that “when it is widely known
that some change of control is in the offing and no rival bids are
forthcoming over an extended period of time, that fact is supportive of the
board’s decision to proceed.”124 Implicit in these Revlon cases is an
understanding that a good-faith search period will necessarily have a fixed
closing date.125 Delaware courts obviously do not expect boards to be
omniscient about the future; one Delaware court emphatically stated:
“Time-bound mortals cannot foresee the future. The test therefore cannot
be whether, with hindsight, the directors actually achieved the best
price.”126
Similarly, because Revlon review requires a commitment to an
effective market check, Delaware courts are leery of covenants that are
“show stoppers.”127 The courts’ reliance on the market in a Revlon review
stands in sharp contrast to Unocal, where the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected the option of letting the market monitor tender offers.128
Despite these differences between Unocal and Revlon, their common
framework of enhanced business judgment review with deference to
independent directors has produced results that strongly favor target
directors under both tests. Like Unocal, corporations in a Revlon mode
have won the vast majority of their cases. Of the thirty-nine cases that
123. Id. at 1288 (reasoning that as the “crucial element supporting a finding of good
faith is knowledge,” the board convinced the chancery court that the timing, publicity, tax
advantages and the corporation’s declining performance made a market test unnecessary, a
finding with which the Delaware Supreme Court agreed); McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d at
1033–34 (Del. Ch. 2004) (citing the use of independent financial advisors as a factor in
directors’ proof that the board was adequately informed about the market).
124. Id. at 1287.
125. In re Toys “R” Us S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008–12 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(sustaining the board’s decision to accept a deal after an open market check of one year
produced no capable buyers).
126. In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011); In
re Fort Howard S’holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 at 40–41 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(stating that a disinterested, well-informed board acting in good faith could lock up a deal
because it could not be responsible for knowing what other deals might emerge in the
future).
127. In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350 (Del. Ch. 1988), slip op.
at 16–17 (citations omitted) (reasoning that the “lock-up was nothing but a ‘show stopper’
that effectively precluded the opening act.”); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 (Del. 1989) (differentiating between valid lock-ups which “draw
bidders into a battle” and invalid lock-ups “which end an active auction and foreclose
further bidding”).
128. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE ILLUSION OF ENHANCED REVIEW

5/3/2013 4:15 PM

629

found a corporation to be in a Revlon mode,129 courts in thirty-one cases (or
seventy-nine percent) held that the boards had met their Revlon duties.130
129. While the corporation was found to be in Revlon mode in thirty-nine cases, fortyeight Delaware courts, consisting of eleven Delaware Supreme Court opinions and thirtyseven Court of Chancery opinions, decided these cases. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780
A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001); Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc.,
567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53
(Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); In re SmurfitStone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79 (Del.
Ch. May 20, 2011); In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A.
No. 6373-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011); Binks v. DSL.net,Inc.,
C.A. No. 2823-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 98 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2010); In re Dollar
Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010); Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Bernal, C.A.
No. 4663-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 111 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2009); In re Lear Corp.
S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch. 2007); Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del.
Ch. 2007); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007);
Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc.,
S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 852
A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004); Cirrus Holding Co. v. Cirrus Indus., 794 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch.
2001); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001);
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000); In re Lukens, Inc. S’holders
Litig., 757 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1999); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, C.A. No. 16301, 1998
Del. Ch. LEXIS 237 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998); Emerson Radio Corp. v. Int’l Jensen, Inc.,
C.A. No. 14992, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1996); Kahn ex. rel. Burnup
& Sims v. Caporella, C.A. No. 13248, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29 (Del. Ch. March 10, 1994);
Rand v. W. Air Lines, C.A. No. 8632, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1994);
Grover v. Simmons (In re Sea-Land Corp. S’holders Litig.), 642 A.2d 792 (Del. Ch. 1993);
In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 11495, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 196
(Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992); Herd v. Major Realty Corp., C.A. No. 10707, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., Inc., C.A. No.
9212, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990); Crown Books Corp. v.
Bookstop, Inc., C.A. No. 11255, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1990); In re De
Soto, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb.
5, 1990); Norberg v. Young’s Mkt. Co., C.A. Nos. 11208, 11253, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 174
(Del. Ch.Dec. 19, 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989
Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 14, 1989); In re Holly Farms S’holders Litig., C.A. No.
10350, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, C.A.
No. 10,095, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988); In re Fort. Howard Corp.
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); In re
J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
130. Of the thirty-nine cases that found the corporation to be in a Revlon mode, see
supra note 129, judges held that thirty-one of the boards in these cases had met their Revlon
duties. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001); Walker v. Lukens, 757 A.2d
1278 (Del. 2000); Rand v. W. Air Lines, Inc, 659 A.2d 228 (Del. 1994); Sea-Land Corp.
S’holder Litig. v. Abely, No. 147, 1993, 1993 Del. LEXIS 362 (Del. Sept. 21, 1993); Gilbert
v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131 (Del. 1990); Norberg v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 571 A.2d 787
(Del. 1990); Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989); Citron v. Fairchild
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Of those cases with successful outcomes, seventy-seven percent had boards
with a majority of independent directors.131 Thus, just as the Delaware
courts are quite deferential to independent boards under Unocal, Delaware
courts most often deferred to independent boards under Revlon as well.132
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989); In re Openlane, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
C.A. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011); In re Orchid
Cellmark, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6373-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75 (Del. Ch.
May 12, 2011); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6164-VCP,
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011); Binks v. DSL.net, Inc., C.A. No. 2823VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 98 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2010); In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder
Litig., 14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94 (Del. Ch.
2007); Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc.,
S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 852
A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004); Cirrus Holding Co. v. Cirrus Indus., 794 A.2d 1191 (Del. Ch.
2001); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. S’holders Litig., 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001);
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2000); Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allen,
C.A. No. 16301, 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 237 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1998); Emerson Radio Corp.
v. Int’l Jensen, Inc., C.A. No. 14992, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 100 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 1996);
Kahn Ex. Rel Burnup & Sims v. Caporella, C.A. No. 13248, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 10, 1994); In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 11495, 1992
Del. Ch. LEXIS 196 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992) (assuming without deciding that corporation
had Revlon duties, but board did not breach those duties); Herd v. Major Realty Corp., C.A.
No. 10707, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 211 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990); Freedman v. Restaurant
Assoc. Indus. Inc., C.A. No. 9212, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990);
Crown Books Corp. v. Bookstop, Inc., C.A. No. 11255, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 28, 1990); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy, C.A. No. 10,095, 1988 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 132 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988); In re Fort. Howard Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No.
9991, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988); and In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); cf. In re Answers Corp. S’holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 6170-VCN, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162, at *13 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2012) (denying
rehearing of previously-denied motion to dismiss as court held pleadings that board
breached its Revlon duties were sufficient to proceed to trial); In re Celera Corp. S’holder
Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 66, at *2–9, 34 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012)
(agreeing that corporation was in a Revlon mode but rejecting a challenge by the largest
shareholder to a settlement of a class action lawsuit arising from a Revlon merger); In re
Delphi Fin. Group S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, at *49–
52 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (denying preliminary injunction of a Revlon merger as claims
that board violated its Revlon duties were insufficient to show a reasonable likelihood of
success at trial); In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 434 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(holding that plaintiffs had a reasonable likelihood of successfully showing that board
violated its Revlon duties, but nevertheless refusing to grant a preliminary injunction of the
merger because no other bid had been submitted and the stockholders could choose whether
to accept or refuse the merger offer); In re Micromet, Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No.
7197-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 41, at *41 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012) (denying preliminary
injunction of a Revlon merger because none of plaintiffs’ claims had a reasonable likelihood
of success).
131. Of the thirty-one cases with successful outcomes, supra note 130, twenty-four had
independent boards, which yields a seventy-seven percent success rate.
132. See, e.g., Wayne Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Corti, C.A. No. 3534-CC, 2009 Del. Ch.
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Interestingly, having an independent board was not outcome
determinative, as five133 of the eight134 cases in which the board failed its
Revlon duties had independent boards. The five cases which faulted
independent directors, however, are easily explained: In one case, the court

LEXIS 126, at *56 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009), aff’d, 996 A.2d 795 (Del. 2010) (refusing to
make an “independent business judgment of whether the consideration obtained for the
shareholders was adequate” and instead limiting its review in Revlon to the board’s
decision-making process).
133. The five cases where independent boards failed their Revlon duties were:
Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition
Corp. v. MacMillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) QVC (both courts); In re Netsmart
Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co.,
926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re De Soto Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 11221, 11222,
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990); cf. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No.
3176-VCN, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105 (Del. Ch. July, 29 2008); Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc.
v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); see infra note 134.
134. These eight failures produced nine opinions, three by the Delaware Supreme Court
and six by the Delaware Court of Chancery. See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network,
637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.
1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986);
Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Bernal, C.A. No. 4663-CC, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 111 (Del. Ch.
June 26, 2009); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007);
Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007); QVC Network Inc. v.
Paramount Commc’ns, 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993); In re De Soto, Inc. S’holder Litig.,
C.A. Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990); In re Holly
Farms S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1988). It should be noted, however, that the Court of Chancery in Topps faulted the target
board solely in failing to release the competing bidder from its standstill agreement. 925
A.2d 58, 92 (Del. Ch. 2010). Cf. Ryan v. Lyondell Chem. Co., C.A. No. 3176-VCN, 2008
Del. Ch. LEXIS 105 (Del. Ch. July, 29 2008) (refusing to grant directors’ motion for
summary judgment as court had concerns that board breached its fiduciary duty of good
faith in fulfilling their Revlon duties). Ryan v. Lyondell was reversed on grounds that board
had not violated its duty of good faith, but leaving intact the Court of Chancery’s view that
corporation was in a Revlon mode. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2000);
Robert M. Bass Grp., Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, n.30 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that
although plaintiff contended the board’s conduct violated both Unocal and Revlon, the
court’s decision to grant an injunction on Unocal grounds “makes it unnecessary to (and the
Court therefore does not) address the plaintiffs’ claim under Revlon.”). After the Court of
Chancery found that an independent board’s defensive tactic failed Unocal, id. at 1238–39,
the board abandoned that failed defensive tactic and instituted a different plan. Therefore,
the case that ultimately went to the Delaware Supreme Court was about the viability of the
board’s restructuring plan (rather than the original defensive tactic), which the Delaware
Supreme Court held warranted review under Revlon, not Unocal. Mills Acquisition Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the board failed the Revlon test. Id. at 1284–88; see also supra note 93 (discussing Bass
v. Evans in the Unocal context). In addition, one district court, applying Delaware law, held
that the board breached its Revlon duties. Black & Decker Corp. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 682
F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
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excoriated the board for its failure to get any reliable market information,135
and four of these cases directly tested the assumption that independent
directors will act independently of corporate management.136 In these latter
four cases, managers engaged in transactions motivated in part by their
own self-interest, and the independent directors did little or nothing to stop
them: Management took action to further the deal that provided for
management’s continued participation, rather than the deal that was best for
their shareholders.137 These boards either allowed corporate management
to tie up a lesser bid that favored themselves,138 or else interfered with their
shareholders’ potential to maximize value by failing to explore the market
fully.139 Thus, the Delaware courts perceived the directors in these cases as
being only nominally independent of management, which remained largely
free to engineer the transaction toward their own benefit. For example, the

135. In re Desoto, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15, at *23 (faulting management who “made
no effort to canvas the market to learn if there were other possible suitors or even to
preliminarily learn if a canvas of the market would be worthwhile”).
136. Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Mills
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Netsmart, 924 A.2d 171;
and Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
137. Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (criticizing
the Paramount board for tying up an inferior deal with Viacom, which included keeping the
Paramount CEO as CEO of merged entity, in the face of a substantially better bid from
QVC); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, n. 32 (Del. 1989)
(reversing court below and enjoining consummation of lockup agreement between target
corporation and a rival bidder because target board breached its duties of care and loyalty in
locking up inferior deal in violation of the board’s Revlon duties, noting “th[e] board’s
virtual abandonment of its oversight functions in the face of . . . [management’s] patent selfinterest was a breach of its fundamental duties of loyalty and care in the conduct of this
auction . . . and created the atmosphere in which [management] . . . could act so freely and
improperly”); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 198 (Del. Ch.
2007) (finding that because management believed its goals of continuing as management
and obtaining a greater percentage of the equity would more likely be achieved with a
private equity buyer than with a strategic buyer, management wrongly steered board away
from exploring the strategic route); Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch.
2007) (granting preliminary injunction because the target board, in violation of its Revlon
duties, refused to release the potentially higher bidder from its standstill agreement, thereby
denying this bidder the chance to bid for the target, while target board simultaneously
agreed to merge with the lower bidder who promised to retain existing target management).
Cf. In re Holly Farms S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 164, *16–18
(Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (skipping over a determination of whether the board was
independent, finding the board failed its Revlon duties by granting covenants to lock up a
deal with a bidder who would keep the target and therefore, management, substantially
intact without notifying the second bidder that the board, contrary to its previous position,
had decided to sell the corporation).
138. See supra note 137.
139. In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007); see
supra note 137.
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Delaware Supreme Court, in Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.,
described the “allegedly ‘independent’ board”140 as “torpid, if not supine, in
its efforts to establish a truly independent auction.”141
Not surprisingly, materially deficient disclosure in proxy materials
sometimes accompanied Revlon breaches, as boards failed to disclose their
conduct that the court subsequently faulted.142 In Netsmart, for example,
the court required the corporation to provide in the proxy materials not only
some of the information plaintiff claimed was omitted regarding
valuation,143 but also a fuller discussion of the board’s decision not to seek
out any strategic buyers.144 Similarly, in In re The Topps Company
Shareholders Litigation,145 the court required the target board to release the
competing bidder from its standstill agreement so that it could present its
argument to the target shareholders:
[T]here is no reasonable basis for permitting the Topps board to
deny its stockholders the chance to consider for themselves
whether to prefer Upper Deck’s higher-priced deal, taking into
account its unique risks, over Eisner’s lower-priced deal, which
has its own risks. . . . But [Topps management] cannot at this
point avoid an injunction on the unsubstantiated premise that the
Topps stockholders will be unable, after the provision of full
information, rationally to decide for themselves between two
competing, non-coercive offers.146
By insisting on full disclosure, the Delaware courts have drawn in the
shareholder vote to monitor further the board’s conduct.
Two lessons emerge from these Revlon cases. One is that Delaware

140. 559 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Del. 1989).
141. Id. at 1280.
142. See Upper Deck Co. v. Topps Co., 926 A. 2d 58, 73 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that
proxy materials were materially misleading in failing to disclose both a valuation that cast
doubt on the fairness of the merger price, and a prospective merger partner’s assurances to
target management that bidder would retain target management).
143. In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 201. The court agreed with plaintiffs that the proxy
materials should have disclosed the projections the financial advisor employed in
performing its discounting cash flow valuation that the advisor used to conclude that the
proposed merger price was fair. The court disagreed with plaintiffs that the proxy materials
were otherwise materially incomplete. Id. at 199–204 (holding that (i) the omitted May 11
projections were not material, (ii) the description in the proxy materials of the financial
advisor’s work was sufficient, and (iii) the proxy materials did not omit material information
on the independence of the special committee).
144. Id. at 209.
145. 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007).
146. Id. at 93 (citation omitted); see also In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig.,
924 A.2d at 206 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting an injunction to require full disclosure so
shareholders can make their own investment decision).
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courts will grant great deference to independent directors, but only when
their conduct demonstrates true independence from management; in those
cases that failed Revlon, the court determined that directors were only
nominally independent.147 The second lesson is that Delaware courts
strongly favor an unfettered transaction market, followed by disclosure to
target shareholders, so that those shareholders can make their own
investment decisions.148 Thus, in these Revlon cases, Delaware courts have
curtailed their role to assuring that the directors are truly independent, the
transaction market is unfettered, and disclosure to shareholders is complete;
thereafter, the external monitors have supplanted judicial review.
C. Entire Fairness
As noted above,149 the Delaware courts diluted their own review under
the Unocal and Revlon tests by deferring to independent directors.
Moreover, in Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court deferred to two other
non-judicial monitors: the market and the shareholder vote. All of these
monitors functioned within the framework of the relevant test: In Unocal,
the independence of the board minimized the directors’ conflict of interest,
and in Revlon, the market and shareholder vote helped the court decide
whether the board had sought the best price. In contrast, the Delaware
Supreme Court has not built any non-judicial monitor into the entire
fairness test. As such, when a court applies the entire fairness test, it does,
in fact, do a searching and thorough inquiry through a process that is the
antithesis of deference.150 As the court in Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting
Corp. explained:
Entire fairness is Delaware’s most onerous standard. When a
147. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1266 (Del.
1989) (observing that “apparent domination of the allegedly ‘independent’ board by the
financially interested members of management, coupled with the directors’ evident passivity
in the face of their fiduciaries duties . . . continued unchanged”). The Mills court also stated
that “[i]n its decisions, the MacMillan board completely relied on management’s portrayal
of Bass[,]” the rival bidder. Id. at 1267. “Here, not only was there such deception, but the
board’s own lack of oversight in structuring and directing the auction afforded management
the opportunity to indulge in the misconduct which occurred.” Id. at 1279. “The board was
torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction . . .” Id. at 1280.
148. See In re Netsmart, 924 A.2d at 207 (“By issuing an injunction requiring additional
disclosure, the court gives stockholders the choice to think for themselves on full
information, thereby vindicating their rights as stockholders to make important voting and
remedial decisions based on their own economic self-interest.”).
149. See discussion of Unocal, supra notes 93–99, and Revlon, supra notes 129–32.
150. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text (describing the board’s heavy
burden to prove entire fairness).
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party challenging a board’s decision alleges and later proves facts
sufficient to overcome the business judgment rule, “the burden
then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the
challenged act or transaction was entirely fair to the corporation
and its shareholders.” Once entire fairness applies, the defendants
must establish “to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was
the product of both fair dealing and fair price.” “Not even an
honest belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be
sufficient to establish entire fairness. Rather, the transaction
itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s
beliefs.”151
Nevertheless, while the entire fairness test mandates judicial scrutiny,152
Delaware courts have supported alternative paths so that defendants can, in
some circumstances, virtually or actually opt out of entire fairness review.
These alternative paths gained prominence in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,153
which required the controlling shareholder to prove the entire fairness of its
freeze-out merger. The controlling shareholder claimed, however, that it
did not control both sides of the transaction because it had ceded control
when it agreed to vote its shares as the majority of the minority shares
voted their shares.154 The Delaware Court of Chancery believed that such
approval by the disinterested shares, combined with other factors,
“conclusively sways the decision in favor of the defendants.”155 While the
151. 28 A.3d 442, 459 (Del. Ch. 2011) (internal citations omitted).
152. In a typical transaction that is subject to entire fairness review, there are no
monitors to which the court can defer: the conflict voids reliance on directors, and
enterprise transactions typically have no shareholder vote or market. See, e.g., Nixon v.
Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (reviewing under the entire fairness test without the
support of any external monitors the board’s decision to repurchase shares from only one
class of stock, which was the class the directors owned); Summa Corp. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 407 (Del.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 853 (1988) (finding that
entire fairness applied because “the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary,
causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the
subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to the minority stockholders of the
subsidiary”); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (applying entire
fairness to a contract between two of the parent’s subsidiaries, as no external monitor
existed for this transaction).
153. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
154. The controlling shareholder ceded its control by allowing the majority of the
minority of shares to veto or approve the transaction. However, since Delaware law
requires a merger to be approved by a majority of outstanding shares, the majority had to
cast its votes in order for the transaction to comply with Delaware law. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011). Therefore, the controlling shareholder said it would vote its
shares however the majority of the minority voted. Since 51.9% of the minority shares
voted for the merger, the majority cast its vote in favor of the merger as well. Weinberger,
457 A.2d at 708.
155. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev’d, 457 A.2d
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Delaware Supreme Court discounted the shareholder vote because the
controlling shareholder had not made a full disclosure,156 the court did not
dispute the Court of Chancery’s logic that approval by disinterested shares
could effectively monitor the transaction. Subsequent cases have made
clear that the vote must be a majority of those minority shares entitled to
vote, rather than simply a majority of those voting.157 One Delaware Court
of Chancery opinion explained the reasoning for requiring the majority of
the outstanding minority shares as follows:
The cleansing effect of ratification depends on the intuition that
when most of the affected minority affirmatively approves the
transaction, their self-interested decision to approve is sufficient
proof of fairness to obviate a judicial examination of that
question. I do not believe that the same confidence flows then
the transaction simply garners more votes in favor than votes
against . . . from the minority who actually vote. That position
requires an untenable assumption that those who did not return a
proxy were members of a ‘silent affirmative majority of the
minority.’ . . . [A] failure to cast a ballot is a de facto no vote.158
Reasoning that approval of the majority of minority shares is a
powerful cleanser if there is full disclosure, the Supreme Court in
Weinberger held that an informed approval by the minority shares would
thereafter shift the burden to the plaintiff of proving unfairness.159 In
reality, giving plaintiffs another chance to prove the board breached its
duties under these circumstances may be merely cosmetic. Plaintiffs would
be quite unlikely to sustain their burden of proving unfairness after a
majority of their peers have voluntarily and knowingly relinquished their

701 (Del. 1983).
156. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712 (finding violation in controlling shareholder’s failure
to disclose details of feasibility study prepared by controlling shareholder and some target
directors).
157. See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc., S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 758-CC, 2009
Del. Ch. LEXIS 174, slip op. at 30 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (requiring a majority of the
outstanding minority shares, not a majority of those voting, to constitute one of the “robust
procedural protections . . . to ensure that the minority stockholders have sufficient
bargaining power and the ability to make an informed choice of whether to accept the . . .
offer for their shares”).
158. In re PNB Holding Co. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 28-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 158,
at *55 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006); cf. Rabkin v. Olin Corp., C.A. No. 7547, 1990 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 50 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), aff’d, 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990) (declining to shift the
burden of proof where the majority of minority shares entitled to vote approved the
transaction, but the vote was not expressly contingent on their approval).
159. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (affirming the proposition “that the plaintiff in a suit
challenging a cash-out merger must allege specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other
items of misconduct to demonstrate the unfairness of the merger terms to the minority”).
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veto power and instead approved the transaction. Delaware courts are
reluctant to substitute their version of what is fair after shareholders have
exercised their power to make their own investment decision. As the Court
of Chancery recently stated, “Delaware courts place great faith in the
discernment and acumen of shareholders . . . [o]nly in extraordinary
circumstances will this Court . . . usurp the rights of shareholders to make
their own informed decisions.”160 Thus, such burden shifting seems largely
superfluous and underscores the efficacy of the vote of the disinterested
shares.
The corporation must satisfy two requirements in order for the
shareholder monitor to shift the burden of proof to plaintiff. One, there
must be full and fair disclosure of all material information to the
shareholders.161 The freezeout cases, however, have isolated a second
requirement: The shareholder vote must be free from coercion. For
example, the Delaware Chancery Court in In re Pure Resources stated that
a controlling shareholder transaction is coercive for minority shareholders
“because the controlling stockholder threatens to take action after the
tender offer that is harmful to the remaining minority . . . or because the
offer’s back-end is so unattractive as to induce tendering at an inadequate
price to avoid a worse fate[.]”162 When both factors are satisfied, however,
Delaware courts defer heavily to the shareholder monitor. As the Court of
Chancery stated, “[w]hen, as here, plaintiffs seek to prevent shareholders
from making a fundamental decision, they bear a heavy burden to persuade
the Court that shareholders are somehow unable to provide for their own
protection, or that effective use of the corporate franchise is barred by some
critical lack of information.”163
In addition to sanctioning disinterested share approval, Weinberger
suggested a second alternative that the defendants could have pursued:
160. La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Del. Ch.
2007); see also In re Netsmart Techs., Inc., S’holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch.
2007) (noting that because there was no competing offer, it would be unwise to “enjoin the
only deal on the table, when the stockholders can make that decision for themselves”).
161. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 702 (nullifying a shareholder vote under entire
fairness because the board had not made full disclosure).
162. In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holder Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 438 n.26 (Del. Ch. 2002); see
also In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83 (Del.
Ch. June 19, 2001) (holding that stockholders were free to accept or reject offers on their
own, but that courts would intervene to protect their right to make a voluntary choice;
voluntariness depended on the absence of improper coercion and the absence of disclosure
violations); cf. Solomon v. Pathe, 672 A.2d 35, 39-40 (Del. 1996) (noting that in the context
of a controlling-shareholder tender offer, which does not require the controlling shareholder
to offer a fair price, there must still be a lack of coercion and full disclosure to target
shareholders).
163. La. Mun. Police, 918 A.2d at 1176.
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create a committee of independent directors to negotiate on behalf of the
minority shares.164 The controlling shareholder in Kahn v. Lynch
Communications Systems, Inc.165 pursued that suggestion. The Delaware
Supreme Court held that Lynch’s committee of independent directors had
failed to act independently,166 noting that independence in this context
requires the controlling shareholder not to dictate the terms of the merger,
and instead to negotiate at arms-length with a committee that exercises real
bargaining power.167 The Delaware Supreme Court held that a truly
independent committee in a controlling-shareholder merger would negate
the need for the defendant to prove the transaction’s fairness. The court,
however, rejected prior holdings that an effective special committee would
invoke the business judgment rule,168 and instead held that, due to the
pervasive power of the controlling shareholder, such a committee would
merely shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff to prove unfairness.169 Just
as disinterested share approval appears to give plaintiffs no realistic
argument as to why the court should hold the transaction is unfair,170 it
seems similarly unlikely that plaintiffs could contend successfully that an
independent committee had nevertheless produced an unfair deal.171

164. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709 n.7 (remarking that this case “could have been
entirely different” had there been an independent committee to deal with the controlling
shareholder at arm’s length, which would have provided “strong evidence” that the
transaction is fair).
165. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) [hereinafter Kahn I]; 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995)
[hereinafter Kahn II]; see also discussion of Kahn infra notes 261–300.
166. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1112.
167. Id. at 1117. For other cases where the independent committee did not function
sufficiently well to shift the burden to plaintiff, see Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422
(Del. 1997); Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 82; Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d
1099 (Del. 1985); In re MAXXAM, Inc., Nos. 12,111 & 12,353, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 51
(Del. Ch. Apr. 4, 1997), reprinted in 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); Kahn v. Dairy Mart
Convenience Stores, Inc., No. 12,489, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 38 (Del. Ch. Mar. 29, 1996),
reprinted in 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1143 (1996); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. S’holders
Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988), reprinted in 14 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 870 (1989).
168. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1115; see infra note 295 and accompanying text.
169. Id. at 1117; accord Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997)
(holding that the entire fairness test, rather than the business judgment rule, continues to
apply when the procedural monitors function effectively).
170. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
171. This argument would require a court to conclude that plaintiff proved that an
independent committee had produced an unfair deal by acting in a grossly negligent manner
in their negotiations. A judge who felt that that the committee had not been aggressive
enough would be more likely to conclude that the committee had not really been sufficiently
independent, as it did in Kahn I. See infra notes 282–83 (discussing the court’s reasoning in
Kahn I as to why the special committee was not independent,); see, e.g., Citron v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990) (shifting the burden to plaintiff after
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Thus, while defendants can shift the burden of proof, either by having
an effective independent committee of directors or by securing the
informed vote of the disinterested shares, Kahn v. Lynch held that entire
fairness would always serve as the standard of review in controllingshareholder mergers. More recent Delaware Court of Chancery cases have,
however, sought to eliminate entire fairness review completely by making
the business judgment rule applicable to controlling-shareholder freeze-out
transactions effectuated by a tender offer followed by a short-form merger
if boards provide for approval by both disinterested directors and
disinterested shares.172 For example, in In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders
Litigation,173 the Delaware Court of Chancery gave a ringing endorsement
to the argument that under certain conditions, defendants could change the
standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment, and refined
these conditions stating:
[I]f a first-step tender offer is both (i) negotiated and
recommended by a special committee of independent directors
and (ii) conditioned on the affirmative tender of a majority of the
minority shares, then the business judgment standard of review
presumptively applies to the freeze-out transaction.174

finding that the independent committee functioned well, and holding that the plaintiff had
been unable to prove the unfairness of the transaction). It is possible, however, for a
committee that is not independent to negotiate a fair deal. Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 90
(upholding the Court of Chancery’s determination on remand that the transaction was
entirely fair, even though the court in Kahn I had determined that the independent
committee had been coerced by the controlling shareholder).
172. See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Cox
Commc’ns, Inc., S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 624 (Del. Ch. 2005); In re Pure Res., Inc.
S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002), appeal denied, C.A. No. 19876, 2002 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 116 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2002); In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 83 (Del. Ch. 2001). The court in CNX noted that it was working off the opinion in
Cox Communications and, to the extent that Cox Communications can be read as allowing
the burden to change from entire fairness to the business judgment rule, even if the
independent committee is neutral on the proposed deal, CNX would disagree. Instead, the
court in CNX affirmatively required a recommendation from the committee. CNX Gas
Corp., 4 A.3d at 415.
173. 4 A.3d 397.
174. Id. at 413. The court in CNX contended that Cox Communications had effectively
changed the prior law articulated in In re Pure Resources, which had delineated a three-part
test for identifying when controlling shareholders two-step freeze-outs could be governed by
the business judgment rule instead of by entire fairness: A controlling shareholder tender
offer will be deemed non-coercive if it is (i) subject to a non-waivable majority of the
minority tender condition, (ii) the controlling shareholder commits to consummate a shortform merger at the same price as the tender offer, and (iii) the controlling shareholder has
not made any retributive threats. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 424; see also infra notes 292–
99 and accompanying text (discussing cases that reject Kahn’s holding that entire fairness is
the proper standard of review for controlling-shareholder mergers).
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In a third-party merger negotiated by the majority, where the majority
and minority shares received different consideration, the Delaware Court of
Chancery also agreed that when both structural protections are in place, the
entire fairness test should not apply because the controlling shareholder is
effectively on only one side of the transaction.175
Thus, a substantial shift has occurred from Kahn v. Lynch, which
contended that the pervasive strength of the controlling shareholder always
required entire fairness review, to these newer Delaware cases, holding that
controlling shareholders may escape the entire fairness review under
certain conditions; in other words, a shift from judicial review to reliance
on monitors. The Delaware Court of Chancery has provided an
explanation for this shift. In In re Pure Resources, then Vice Chancellor
Strine (now Chancellor Strine) noted that the Delaware Supreme Court in
Kahn “saw the controlling stockholder as the 800-pound gorilla whose
urgent hunger . . . is likely to frighten . . . putatively independent directors
who might well have been hand-picked by the gorilla . . . .”176 Current
Court of Chancery decisions allowing the business judgment rule to govern
under certain conditions do not repudiate Kahn’s argument about the
capacity of a controlling shareholder to overreach, but instead incorporate
those concerns into procedural requirements for controlling-shareholder
transactions to qualify as non-coercive.177 Thus, these courts have provided
content and depth to the external monitors, thereby allowing courts to rely
comfortably on decisions made by independent directors and disinterested
shares. As the court in In re Pure Resources summarized:
This does not mean that controlling stockholder tender offers do
not pose risks to minority stockholders; it is only to acknowledge
that the corporate law should not be designed on the assumption
that diversified investors are infirm but instead should give great
deference to transactions approved by them voluntarily and
knowledgeably.178
Similarly, in order to demonstrate the efficacy of disinterested committees
combined with disinterested shares, the court in CNX cited numerous
examples of independent committees and disinterested shares rebuffing a

175. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc., S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 758-CC, 2009 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 174, at *42 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009).
176. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 436. The Court of Chancery further noted that Kahn’s
view that independent directors could be so intimidated is “premised on a less trusting view
of independent directors than is reflected in the important case of Aronson v. Lewis . . .
which presumed that a majority of independent directors can impartially decide whether to
sue a controlling stockholder.” Id. at 436 n.17.
177. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 178–79.
178. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444.
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controlling-shareholder transaction:
Post-Lynch experience shows that special committees can
negotiate effectively with controllers and that both special
committees and minority stockholders can reject squeeze-out
proposals. . . . These examples augur in favor of a unified
standard under which independent directors and unaffiliated
stockholders are given the tools to negotiate with controllers,
backstopped by meaningful judicial review for fairness when
those tools are withheld.179
Thus, Delaware courts do a searching review under the entire fairness
test. Nevertheless, in those situations, where corporations can create an
independent committee of directors and can submit the transaction to a vote
of their disinterested shares, corporations can, at a minimum, shift the
burden of proving unfairness to the plaintiff, and increasingly can opt out
of the entire fairness test completely. As a result, corporations can
effectively substitute two external monitors—independent directors and the
shareholder vote—for intrusive judicial review.
Before leaving the discussion of entire fairness, it is worth contrasting
the role of the monitors: In Unocal and Revlon, the monitors functioned
within those tests, while the monitors in the entire fairness test may change
the standard of review. Moreover, it is important to differentiate the
shareholder vote as a monitor, as it is in entire fairness, from Unocal,
where the shareholder vote is only a safety valve. A vote by disinterested
shares on a transaction whereby shareholders sell their stock provides a
strong monitor because such a transaction will surely garner their attention.
In contrast, a standard election of directors not only involves merely voting
in general agreement or disagreement with the candidates for the board, but
also will permit all shares, rather than just disinterested shares, to vote,
thereby diluting any monitoring effect. Thus, in order to serve as an
effective monitor, the shareholder vote must be only by disinterested shares
and only on the specific transaction, rather than simply a vote for or against
candidates for the board of directors.180

179. CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 413–14.
180. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text (discussing shareholder voting as a
safety valve in Unocal); cf. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No.
16415, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *114 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“[N]o Delaware case has
held that burden-shifting can be accomplished by a tender of shares rather than by an actual
vote. Nor should a tender be treated as the equivalent of an informed vote. Shareholders
cannot be deemed to have ratified board action unless they are afforded the opportunity to
express their approval of the precise conduct being challenged.”).
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D. Blasius and Schnell
Like the entire fairness test, Blasius and Schnell demand judicial
review. Although both Blasius and Schnell are largely applicable only in
voting cases, they provide two different justifications for the proposition
that only courts can monitor certain issues. One is that, as in the Blasius
fact pattern, there are simply no monitors available. Given that the court in
Blasius reasoned that the board had no power to decide who should serve
as directors,181 the court could not rely on board monitoring. Furthermore,
since the board’s conduct stymied the shareholder vote, there was no
shareholder vote to which the court could look for guidance. Finally, there
is no market for board seats. As a result, judicial review was the sole
option. Thus, a court alone must determine if the directors’ primary
purpose is to disenfranchise their shareholders, and whether the directors
demonstrated a compelling purpose for their actions. The second
justification for judicial review, as in Schnell, is that the test requires the
use of equitable powers, which obviously belong only to judges.
Therefore, courts applying the Schnell doctrine cannot defer to the board,
the disinterested shares, or the market.
While courts have no choice other than to go it alone when applying
the Blasius and Schnell standards, Delaware courts have made it extremely
difficult to trigger either of these tests. As noted above,182 the court in
Blasius retreated from holding that directors who trip Blasius have acted
per se illegally only because the court did not want to exclude the
possibility that some scenario might warrant such board conduct. The
court’s consideration of making such board conduct per se illegal, however,
coupled with the resulting test whereby directors must demonstrate a
compelling purpose for disenfranchising their shareholders, strongly
suggest that it is likely impossible for the board to pass this test. As a result
of this difficulty, courts are highly reluctant to trigger a test that produces

181. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that
in the allocation of authority between shareholders and directors, directors lack the authority
to decide who serves on the board). In several other cases, Delaware courts have similarly
held that the board lacked the power for its desired actions. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003) (striking down defensive measures
that lacked a fiduciary out for directors); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys.,
Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 86-87 (Del. Ch.), aff’d on other grounds, Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (deeming poison pill invalid because pill stripped board
of its general management authority for a given period of time); cf. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (holding that a shareholder bylaw that had
no fiduciary out to requirement that board must reimburse proxy expenses under certain
conditions exceeded permissible parameters for bylaws).
182. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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an inevitable outcome. As the Delaware Court of Chancery in Mercier
reasoned:
The great strength of Blasius . . . came along with some
overbroad language that rendered the standard of review
articulated in the case too crude a tool for regular
employment. . . . [T]he trigger for the test’s application . . . is so
pejorative that it is more a label for a result than a useful guide to
determining what standard of review should be used by a judge to
reach an appropriate result.183
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court of Chancery explained that it would
use the equitable power invoked in Blasius “sparingly, and only in
circumstances in which self-interested or faithless fiduciaries act to deprive
stockholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate in the matter [to be
voted on] and to thwart what appears to be the will of a majority of the
stockholders.”184
Thus far, only five cases, four by the Delaware Court of Chancery and
one by the Delaware Supreme Court, have triggered the Blasius test,185 and,
at best, only one passed.186 The small number of cases under Blasius
183. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 805–06 (Del. Ch. 2007).
184. In re MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674 (Del. Ch. 2004).
185. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) (invalidating
bylaw amendment that expanded the size of Liquid Audio’s board because of lack of
compelling justification under Blasius); Mercier, 929 A.2d 786 (finding that a special
committee had a compelling justification under Blasius for postponing a shareholder vote on
a merger that independent directors believed was in the best interests of shareholders);
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000) (striking down a supermajority
bylaw amendment because it interfered with a shareholder vote and lacked a compelling
justification under Blasius); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., C.A. No. 17637,
2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (denying a motion for summary judgment
because of the applicability of Blasius to the board’s decision to adjourn a shareholder
meeting); Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998) (finding a
cognizable Blasius claim regarding a “dead hand” provision because of the provision’s
effect on shareholders’ ability to elect a board that would accept a takeover offer).
186. The one case that arguably passed the Blasius test was Mercier. In Mercier, the
Delaware Court of Chancery criticized Blasius, contending that once the test was triggered,
no board could ever successfully offer a compelling purpose for purposefully
disenfranchising its shareholders. 929 A.2d at 806. The Mercier court thus concluded that
Blasius was not a test at all, since it could never be passed. Id. The Mercier court
contended that the board’s conduct should be reviewed through a modified Unocal test. Id.
at 810–11. After showing how such a modified Unocal review would work in this context,
and after finding that the target board would pass Unocal because it acted in good faith to
preserve a value-maximizing offer, the Mercier court returned to the Blasius test. The court
concluded that since it had no authority to overrule the Blasius test, which the Delaware
Supreme Court had affirmed in MM Cos., the Inter-Tel board’s conduct would have to be
filtered through the Blasius test. Id. at 813. The Mercier court held that the board had a
compelling justification for its conduct and therefore successfully met the Blasius test. Id. at
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indicates the courts’ reluctance to invoke a test that is impossible—or
nearly so—for boards to pass.187
Similarly, when a court invokes the Schnell doctrine, the judge cannot
rely on any monitor to decide that the board’s conduct is both legal and
inequitable. Moreover, the consequence of a board failing Schnell is that
the judge will exercise its equitable powers. Like Blasius, courts will
invoke the Schnell doctrine sparingly, but for reasons that differ from the
infrequent use of Blasius. The Schnell doctrine allows courts, without
boundaries or guideposts, to invalidate otherwise legal conduct.188 Thus,
the Delaware Supreme Court has warned courts that a capacious use of the
Schnell doctrine could “imperil[]” the stability of Delaware law.189
Delaware courts have responded to this warning. Despite its forty-plus
year history,190 and its facial applicability to any aspect of corporate law,
Delaware courts have applied the Schnell doctrine only thirteen times191

819; cf. Peerless, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *54 (finding that Blasius applied and
expressing doubt that the defendants could provide a compelling justification for their
conduct, but refusing to resolve that issue in a motion for summary judgment).
187. See, e.g., Mercier, 929 A.2d at 805–06 (“The great strength of Blasius . . . came
along with some overbroad language that rendered the standard of review articulated in the
case too crude a tool for regular employment.”); In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 20269, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *42 (Del. Ch. May 4, 2005) (“[I]t is unlikely,
if not impossible, for a defendant to meet this burden on a motion to dismiss.”).
188. See Mary Siegel, The Dangers of Equitable Remedies, 15 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 86,
95–96 (2009) (suggesting that Schnell be limited to voting cases because it could potentially
invalidate any type of conduct on equitable grounds).
189. Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 258 n.1 (Del. 1991); see also
Accipiter Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115, 127 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to
apply Schnell because that doctrine should be used only “where compelling circumstances
suggest that the company unfairly manipulated the voting process in such a serious way as
to constitute an evident or grave incursion on the fabric of the corporate law”); Mary Siegel,
Going Private: Three Doctrines Gone Astray, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 399, 419–22 (2008)
(suggesting that Schnell be limited to “cases involving voting mechanics”); Siegel, supra
note 188, at 93–96 (noting problems with the boundless nature of the Schnell doctrine as
well as its enabling of judges becoming “super-legislators”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate
Action Is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances In Which It Is Equitable To Take
That Action: The Implicit Corollary To The Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW.
877 (2005) (noting the danger that courts will forget to respect the law side of the law-equity
divide in exercising their equitable powers).
190. Schnell was decided in 1971.
191. Only thirteen Delaware cases (plus Schnell itself) involved a true Schnell analysis.
See Portnoy v. Cryo-Cell Int’l, Inc., 940 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 2008) (finding Schnell violation
because of agreement between shareholder and incumbent board which involved retaining
the board in exchange for adding a seat to be filled by the shareholder’s designee); Accipiter
Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115 (Del. Ch. 2006) (declining to invalidate action
taken at annual meeting under Schnell because the action at issue was not sufficiently
extraordinary to meet the Schnell standard); Hollinger Int’l v. Black, 844 A.2d 1022, 1080–
81 (Del. Ch. 2004), aff'd, 872 A.2d 559 (Del. 2005) (holding Schnell applicable to bylaw
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after Schnell was decided, and all but two of these cases192 involved some
aspect of shareholder voting rights.
Thus, while Blasius and Schnell mandate judicial review, the
justification for applying either of these doctrines is unique. Although
there are no monitors to use in either of these tests, courts have made the

amendments and then striking down those bylaw amendments as inequitable); Linton v.
Everett, C.A. No. 15219, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (finding a
Schnell violation where shareholders were given insufficient notice of a stockholder meeting
to be able to nominate opposing directors); Dolgoff v. Projectavision, Inc., C.A. No. 1168,
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 24, at *25 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 1996) (refusing to grant preliminary
injunction to delay a board meeting that “may have caught Mr. Dolgoff by surprise,
arguably handicapping his ability to mount a counter-proxy campaign” because this was not
sufficient to satisfy the Schnell test); Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., C.A.
No. 11779, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 1991) (finding Schnell violation
where enforcement of bylaw would have led to incumbent board running unopposed in
election); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990) (declining to find a
Schnell violation where the board decided to hold an annual shareholder meeting later than
it had originally intended to in order to explore alternatives to a hostile tender offer);
Seagraves v. Urstadt Prop. Co., C.A. No. 10307, 1989 Del Ch. LEXIS 155 (Del. Ch. Nov.
13, 1989) (refusing to dismiss a complaint regarding delisting of shares and nonpayment of
dividends despite a lack of impropriety because of the potential for equitable relief under
Schnell); Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987) (finding a Schnell
violation where directors postponed a meeting at which they would likely not have been reelected); Packer v. Yampol, C.A. No. 8432, 1986 Del. Ch. LEXIS 413 (Del. Ch. Apr. 18,
1986) (finding a Schnell violation where issuance of new stock would have the effect of
perpetuating directors in office); Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407–08
(Del. 1985) (finding under Schnell that the board’s funding of an ESOP was inequitable as
the dilutive issuance had the “primary purpose of perpetuating . . . control” and
disenfranchising shareholders); Huffington v. Enstar Corp., C.A. No. 7543, 1984 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 492 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1984) (finding no Schnell violation where directors changed
date of the annual stockholder meeting in order to facilitate the sale of the company);
Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (striking down a bylaw
amendment enacted because of plaintiff’s intent to wage a proxy contest as inequitable
under Schnell). However, Delaware courts have cited to Schnell in a variety of contexts
without going on to apply the doctrine, perhaps to remind corporations that the court has a
trump card with which it could invalidate inequitable conduct. See, e.g., Del. Ins. Guar.
Ass’n v. Christiana Care Health Servs., 892 A.2d 1073, 1078 n.20 (Del. 2006) (citing, in an
insurance dispute,Schnell’s general rule that legal action is not necessarily equitable); In re
Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 10350, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *28 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 22, 1989) (citing Schnell where stockholders wished to enjoin a vote on a merger
until after their challenges to the merger had been resolved); Smith v. SPNV Holdings, Inc.,
C.A. Nos. 8395, 8080, 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 505, at *8 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 1987) (citing
Schnell to support that “[u]nfair dealing by a controlling shareholder is not permitted
regardless of the action’s legality”).
192. The two cases that did not relate to shareholder voting were Hollinger, 844 A.2d at
1022 (striking down as inequitable bylaw amendments that dismantled a special committee
which was created to evaluate a transaction), and Seagraves, 1989 Del Ch. LEXIS 155, at
*11-12 (noting the potential for relief under Schnell regarding the delisting of shares and the
nonpayment of dividends).
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hurdle to triggering either of these tests so high that the two tests are rarely
used.
E. Summary
Delaware courts have relied heavily on the independent directors in
the Unocal, Revlon, and entire fairness tests. In Revlon and entire fairness,
Delaware courts have also added the monitors of disinterested shares and
the market monitor, which plays a focal role in Revlon. Equally significant
is that Delaware courts are increasingly embracing these external monitors,
preferring decisions by independent directors and disinterested shares over
judicial review of the entire fairness of controlling-shareholder
transactions. Finally, Blasius and Schnell remain tests that are subject
solely to judicial review, but invocation of either test is a rarity.
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE EXTERNAL MONITORS
The previous section demonstrated that lurking beneath the veneer of
judicial review are three prevalent monitors: independent directors,
disinterested shares, and the market.193 As noted above,194 judicial review
under Unocal, Revlon, and entire fairness relies heavily on independent
directors. In addition, courts applying both the Revlon and entire fairness
tests added a reliance on the shareholder monitor. Finally, Revlon also
relies heavily on the market monitor. While judicial reliance on these
external monitors has not always been explicit, there is little doubt that
these external monitors have heavily impacted Delaware court decisions.
Each external monitor, however, has its strengths and weaknesses, or at
least, its supporters and detractors.
Those who support trusting independent directors have one main
argument: While concerns may exist relating to entrenchment motives or

193. When appraisal rights are available, some courts consider this right as an added
monitor. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1192
(Del. Ch. 2007) (noting that although “serious questions” about the Caremark board’s
merger negotiations existed, “the ability of shareholders to vote in a fully-informed fashion,
and the availability of appraisal rights to any shareholders that may be dissatisfied with the
merger consideration shape the appropriate limits of judicial intervention”). In Delaware,
however, shareholders do not often have appraisal rights, as mergers are the only transaction
that offers these rights, which will nevertheless be denied if the market-out exception
applies. See infra note 216 (discussing market-out exception to appraisal rights).
194. See supra Part II.E.
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structural bias for inside directors,195 approval by independent directors
“has the effect of placing the board’s decision-making function into
impartial hands.”196 In Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enterprises, Inc., the
Delaware Court of Chancery explained:
Where decisions are made by outside independent directors
instead of members of management who have a presumptive
desire to retain their employment, the concern that the board’s
decisions are tainted by self-serving motives is mitigated, and
there naturally follows a greater presumption of good faith and
reasonable investigation.197
Indeed, courts198 and Congress199 alike have assumed that an independent
board is the best tool for monitoring corporate management. As one
scholar wrote, “[t]he independent director has always held a special place
in the hearts and minds of corporate lawmakers as an idealized monitor of
executives’ behavior.”200
195. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 232 (2002) (noting
that “an insider-dominated board is seen as a device for management entrenchment”);
William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional
Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (1999) (noting that conventional wisdom holds that
inside directors are more likely to take self-interested actions than are independent
directors); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You
Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 19
(2003) (noting that the traditional distinction between inside directors and outside directors
is sensible because inside directors often have personal interests that are adverse to the
firm).
196. Clark W. Furlow, Back to Basics: Harmonizing Delaware’s Law Governing Going
Private Transactions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 85, 98 (2007).
197. Selectica, Inc. v. Versata Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 4241-VCN, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS
39, at *51 (Del. Ch. Mar. 1, 2010).
198. See supra note 9 (explaining that courts will defer to independent and wellinformed directors under the business judgment rule); supra notes 88–89 (stating that courts
will give deference to independent boards under Unocal); supra note 113 and accompanying
text (stating courts will defer to independent directors under Revlon)
199. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (directing the
Securities and Exchange Commission to undertake rulemaking, including mandatory listing
standards for self-regulatory organizations, and subsequent enactment of rules by the New
York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations
requiring all listed companies to have boards consisting of a majority of independent
directors); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, ,Pub. L. No. 111203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–94 (2010) (requiring the Securities and Exchange
Commission to issue further rules directing the exchanges to require independent
compensation committees).
200. Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1175, 1175 (2011). For a discussion of whether independent boards are more effective
managers, see Bhagat & Black, supra note 195 (finding little difference in performance
among firms that have independent boards versus those that do not).
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On the other hand, critics of trusting directors are suspicious that even
those who legally qualify as independent201 may not actually be free from
bias: “Independent directors traditionally were nominated by insiders and,
in any event, generally are selected from the business community to ensure
that they will have adequate expertise. Because of structural bias, it may be
difficult for them to criticize either their fellow directors or the officers of
the corporation.”202 Along the same lines, another commentator reasoned,
“[d]isinterested directors may not have a financial interest in the transaction
in question, but they may nevertheless be conflicted with respect to the
decision itself, if only because of its effect on a colleague.”203
Thus, supporters and opponents offer different views on whether
legally-qualified independent directors are truly free of structural bias.
Delaware courts, by choosing to rely on independent directors, have taken a
leap of faith that independent directors will make independent decisions.
The discussion above analyzing Unocal and Revlon cases in which a few
independent boards nevertheless failed to meet their respective duties204
demonstrates, however, that the Delaware courts’ faith in independent
directors goes only so far; these Unocal and Revlon failures reveal that
Delaware courts are attuned to the possibility of nominally independent
boards acting passively and subserviently to management’s desires. It is
impossible to conjecture about the extent to which Delaware’s “trust but
verify” approach sufficiently satisfies ardent believers in structural bias.
In contrast to the singular point of dispute about the efficacy of the
independent-director monitor, those who support disinterested share
approval offer three main arguments. One contention is that any self201. See supra note 6 (defining independent director).
202. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 460
(2008); see also Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1435, 1448–49 (2011) (arguing that because there are practical and
psychological limitations on independence, it is questionable whether even outside directors
can be independent from the CEO); Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good
Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833, 838 (2007) (explaining that even outside
directors will want to protect against hostile takeovers in order to protect their board
positions and may also be “motivated by the ‘pernicious golden rule’ to defer to those
whose deference they would want as officers . . . . thus mak[ing] decisions that favor those
officers and themselves even if doing so is not the best course for the corporation as a
whole”).
203. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U.
L.Q. 821, 842 (2004); see also William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287,
1308 (2000) (recognizing concerns that an independent committee may not be truly
independent as they are “not hermetically sealed off from the inside directors”).
204. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (discussing cases where
independent boards failed the Unocal test); supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text
(discussing cases where independent boards failed the Revlon test).
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dealing is effectively eliminated when the minority shares have the power
to refuse the transaction.205 Second, the shareholder vote provides an
objective monitor of the transaction, rather than a court’s subjective view
of whether the transaction is fair or whether the directors were properly
motivated.206 Finally, such approval lets shareholders make their own
investment decisions instead of a court deciding whether the deal
recommended by the board is fair. As the court in Louisiana Municipal
Police Employees’ Retirement System v. Crawford stated, “[o]nly in
extraordinary circumstances will this Court . . . usurp the rights of
shareholders to make their own informed decisions.”207
On the other hand, some contest the efficacy of disinterested
shareholder approval on the theory that shareholders may simply
rubberstamp management’s recommendations.208 Others contend that
shareholders are not able to evaluate the terms of the transaction and have
no viable option if they reject the deal.209 These issues are accentuated in a
205. See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 413–14 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(explaining that in In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 957 (Del. Ch. 2010)
[Revlon II], because the majority of the minority shares twice rejected the deal proposed by
the controlling shareholder, shareholders had been able to thwart management’s selfdealing); id. (noting that in In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 83 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001), minority shares rebuffed controlling-shareholder’s
exchange offer and thus effectively combated the controller’s efforts to self-deal).
206. See Mary Siegel, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics: A Proposal for Reform, 36
HASTINGS L.J. 377, 407–08 (1985) (“[A] fair vote of shareholders is an objective criterion
that replaces judicial evaluation of management’s motives.”).
207. 918 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Del. Ch. 2007); see also Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v.
Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010) (“[S]tockholders with economic ownership are
expressing their collective view as to whether a particular course of action serves the
corporate goal of stockholder wealth maximization.”); In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S’holders
Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 208 (Del. Ch. 2007) (refusing to “enjoin the only deal on the table,
when the stockholders can make that decision themselves.”); In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders
Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 444 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“[C]orporate law should not be designed on the
assumption that diversified investors are infirm but instead should give great deference to
transactions approved by them voluntarily and knowledgeably.”); see also Allen et al.,
supra note 2, at 1308 (reasoning that if the shareholder vote is uncoerced and is fully
informed, the shareholder vote should be dispositive, especially given the Delaware
Supreme Court’s “rightful emphasis on the importance of the shareholder franchise and its
exercise”).
208. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective,
56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624, 676-77 (1981) (“[S]hareholders often behave like sheep when asked
to vote on a transaction, and support docilely any recommendation management makes.”).
209. See Bevis Longstreth, Fairness of Management Buyouts Needs Evaluation, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 10, 1983, at 14 (noting that shareholders may not be in a position to evaluate
transaction and often do not have realistic alternatives to approval); see, e.g., Kahn I, 638
A.2d at 1116–17 (noting the concern that minority shareholder rights could be lost due to
intended or unintended coercion by the majority); In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A.
No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (holding that minority
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controlling-shareholder transaction, where concerns about “the potential for
process manipulation by the controlling stockholder, and the concern that
the controlling stockholder’s continued presence might influence even a
fully informed shareholder vote”210 may leave opponents uneasy. Those
who share these concerns may derive comfort from the Delaware Supreme
Court’s insistence in Kahn v. Lynch on reviewing all controllingshareholder mergers under the entire fairness standard211 or on the ability of
the court to discount the shareholder vote by finding that defendants did not
make a full disclosure.212
Finally, Delaware courts have relied on a market monitor in a variety
of contexts,213 but the transaction market is the one relevant for our
purposes. In order for directors to fulfill their Revlon duties, “[m]arket
forces must be allowed to operate freely to bring the target’s shareholders
the best price available for their equity.”214 Proponents of the market

shareholders may improperly lose their legal status as shareholders where they are not
realistically given a choice, and are forced to accept the terms of the offer); In re Pure Res.,
Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting the threat that controlling
stockholders may coerce minority stockholders who could, essentially, be forced to accept
the offered terms); In re Best Lock Corp. S’holder Litig., 845 A.2d 1057, 1075–76 (Del. Ch.
2001) (holding that the plaintiffs, who tendered their shares after a merger was
consummated, “did not do so voluntarily,” so as to acquiesce to the merger and forfeit any
claims, because they were not given a “meaningful choice” when they were faced with a
choice between “accepting the possibly inadequate merger consideration and pursuing a
possibly inadequate appraisal remedy”).
210. In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1205 (Del. Ch.
1995); see also In re JCC Holding Co., Inc. S’holders Litig., 843 A.2d 713, 723 (Del. Ch.
2003) (“[I]nherent coercion is thought to undermine the fairness-guaranteeing effect of a
majority-of-the-minority vote condition because coerced fear or a hopeless acceptance of a
dominant power’s will, rather than rational self-interest, is deemed likely to be the
animating force behind the minority’s decision to approve the merger.”).
211. See infra note 270 and accompanying text. For a contrary view, see infra notes
292–300 and accompanying text (identifying cases criticizing Kahn’s holding that entire
fairness must remain the standard of review in all controlling-shareholder mergers, and
therefore finding ways to distinguish cases from Kahn).
212. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985) (negating
shareholder vote on grounds that “the Board’s lack of valuation information should have
been disclosed”); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983) (negating the
effect of a shareholder vote because the controlling shareholder failed to disclose to
shareholders the details of a feasibility study it prepared with the help of some target
directors).
213. See, e.g., Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880 (Del. 2002) (finding market
price relevant in a reverse-stock split); Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7046,
1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991) (finding market price relevant in sale of
corporation); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 (Del.
Ch. 2003) (finding market price as the sole determinative factor in appraisal proceeding).
214. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986); see also supra notes 119–24 and accompanying text (discussing importance of
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monitor offer one major argument: under the right conditions, the market
will offer fair value. As then-Vice Chancellor, and now Justice Jacobs,
explained:
The most persuasive evidence of the fairness of the . . . merger
price is that it was the result of arm’s-length negotiations
between two independent parties, where the seller . . . was
motivated to seek the highest available price, and a diligent and
extensive canvass of the market had confirmed that no better
price was available . . . . The fact that a transaction price was
forged in the crucible of objective market reality (as
distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of
a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is
fair.215
Rather than voicing a generic objection to the fairness of the
transaction market, critics instead focus on conditions when that market
might not offer fair value.216 The main concern surfaces when the
market check in Revlon test).
215. Unimation, 1991 WL 29303, at *17; see also M.P.M. Enters., Inc., v. Gilbert, 731
A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (“A merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where
there are no claims of collusion is a very strong indication of fair value.”).
216. In contrast to the transaction market, the inherent reliability of the stock market
price is more contentious and has surfaced specifically in the context of whether there
should be a market-out exception to appraisal rights. Thirty-six states have adopted a
market-out exception on the theory that, since the market offers fair value, there is no need
for the judicially-determined valuation that appraisal rights offer. See Mary Siegel, An
Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act’s Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 246 n.75, 248 n.88 (2011) (listing states with market-out
exceptions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(1) (2001) (denying appraisal rights if there is a
publicly-traded market); see also tit. 8, §§ 262(b)(2), (b)(3) (restoring appraisal rights under
certain conditions despite market-out exception). Concerns about the reliability of the
market price if the market is illiquid or if the transaction is a conflict transaction caused the
authors of the Model Act’s statutory appraisal provisions to limit the Act’s market-out
exception to those situations where the market is sufficiently liquid and the transaction is not
an interested transaction. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 13.02(b)(1), (b)(4) (2010) (listing
requirements for liquidity and conflict-of-interest, respectively). For a discussion of the
MBCA’s market-out exception, see Siegel, supra, at 245–56. Eleven states have thus far
adopted the Model Act’s limits on the market-out exception. See id. at 248 nn.91–92
(listing states that limit the market-out to a liquid market and a non-conflict transaction).
Fourteen states have no market-out exception at all. Id. at 246 n.76, 248 n.88. When
appraisal rights are available in Delaware, Delaware courts begin the evaluation with a
strong belief that the stock market offers reliable evidence of fair value. See, e.g.,
Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 889–90 (relying on the average of the market price over a ten-day
period preceding the proposed transaction to determine the fair value that corporation owed
to those shareholders who were to be cashed out in a reverse stock-split, noting, “our
jurisprudence recognizes that in many circumstances a property interest is best valued by the
amount a buyer will pay for it. The Vice Chancellor correctly concluded that a wellinformed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate
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controlling shareholder or insiders can taint the transaction market. For
example, an offer by a third party that is inadequate will likely be met with
competing bids, but a similar transaction by a controlling shareholder will
not.217 Finally, questions also may arise whether bids by insiders, even if
not controlling shareholders, have enough of an “inside track” to similarly
distort the market. As the Delaware Supreme Court in Applebaum v.
Avaya, Inc. reasoned:
When a controlling stockholder presents a transaction that will
free it from future dealings with the minority stockholders,
opportunism becomes a concern. Any shortfall imposed on the
minority stockholders will result in a transfer of value to the
controlling stockholder. The discount in value could be imposed
deliberately or could be the result of an information asymmetry
where the controlling stockholder possesses material facts that
are not known in the market.218
Delaware courts have met these concerns about the market by
strengthening procedural protections to thwart the otherwise unbridled
power of controlling shareholders.219
Despite arguments for and against the three external monitors,
Delaware courts have developed a broad trust in them, with some finetuning. Delaware courts have calibrated their reliance on independent
directors by delving below the label of independence until courts are
satisfied that these directors have effectively represented their shareholders
and explored the relevant market; established procedures to assure that the
shareholder vote is both informed and voluntary; and required boards to get
reliable, objective, market information. This Article now examines a few

the court could impose”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship, 847 A.2d 340 (using market price
as the only factor in appraisal proceeding). The Delaware Supreme Court will qualify its
confidence in the market price if the stock is not actively traded or the transaction is an
insider transaction. Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 891 n.38 (noting that market price might
satisfy the fair value requirement but not where the market price was set by the issuer
company, acting as the primary (if not the sole) buyer); see also Gesoff v. IIC Indus. Inc.,
902 A.2d 1130, 1154 (Del. Ch. 2006) (stating that a thinly traded, illiquid market does not
produce a fair price). One final issue is that, in Delaware, the stock value for appraisal
purposes will not include any minority discount, Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d
1137, 1141 (Del. 1989), while the market price will reflect the value of a minority position.
In re Loral Space & Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Litig., C.A. Nos. 2808-VCS, 3022-VCS, 2008
Del. Ch. LEXIS 136, at *116 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 2008) (noting that the trading price “was a
minority value . . . . a rational market price would not attribute anything but a trivial value to
the voting rights attached to the [minority] shares”).
217. See supra note 210 (explaining concern that shareholders feel pressured to take the
deal offered by the controlling shareholder).
218. 812 A.2d at 891.
219. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
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“outlier cases” in which Delaware courts trusted only themselves despite
the availability of one or more external monitors.
IV. A FEW OUTLIERS
Thus far, this Article has both demonstrated that Delaware courts
typically avoid judicial review when the external monitors are available
and identified the relevant refinements to each monitor. This section will
discuss some “outlier” cases, namely those where a Delaware court went
out of its way to engage in judicial review despite the availability of one or
more of the monitors in their purest and best form. This section offers as
outlier examples two decisions of the Delaware Supreme Court: Omnicare
v. NCS and Kahn v. Lynch.220 This section both explains the court’s
reasoning for trusting only itself and illustrates that the cost accompanying
such judicial intervention has been decisions that even Delaware courts
find questionable.
A. Unocal Test: Omnicare
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.221 is an outlier case, because
the Delaware Supreme Court had all external monitors in play and instead
chose to disregard them. The facts are not in dispute. When NCS
Corporation was near bankruptcy, it explored strategic alternatives. While
two corporations, Omnicare, Inc. and Genesis Health Ventures, expressed
interest in purchasing NCS, both suitors were problematic: Omnicare
would not to commit to a deal during the pendency of NCS’ search process,
and Genesis refused to proceed unless it had an exclusivity agreement and
a lock-up in any potential deal.222 Ultimately, the NCS board decided that
“balancing the potential loss of the Genesis deal against the uncertainty of
Omnicare’s letter, results in the conclusion that the only reasonable
220. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (disregarding, under the
business judgment rule, the decision of an independent board, the shareholder vote, and the
market because once the court found the board to be grossly negligent, the court reasoned
that this negligence negatively infected the disclosure to shareholders that provided the basis
for their vote and did not allow the board to adequately assess market information); Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (giving the Court of Chancery the option to
disregard the decision of an independent committee that fulfilled its fiduciary duties and
instead substitute the Court of Chancery’s own business judgment on whether a derivative
suit should proceed).
221. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
222. Id. at 921.
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alternative for the Board of Directors is to approve the Genesis
transaction.”223 The NCS board therefore approved a two-part plan that
guaranteed the approval of the Genesis merger: The board would commit
to recommend the Genesis transaction to the NCS shareholders without a
fiduciary-out clause,224 and the majority shareholders—who were also
officers and directors of NCS225—agreed to sign voting agreements to vote
their shares in favor of the Genesis merger.226 Shortly after NCS executed
these agreements, Omnicare presented NCS with a proposal that was more
favorable to the NCS shareholders,227 and the NCS board withdrew its
recommendation to the NCS shareholders endorsing the Genesis merger.228
The board’s withdrawal of its recommendation, however, was purely
cosmetic, as the Genesis deal had previously secured the requisite board
recommendation and shareholder vote.229
Omnicare and some NCS minority shareholders sued to enjoin the
merger, claiming that the deal-protection devices in the NCS-Genesis
merger agreement violated the NCS board’s fiduciary duties because the
agreement did not allow for the board to back out of the deal if a superior
transaction—such as Omnicare’s—emerged in the future.230 When the
Court of Chancery denied the request for an injunction, the case went to the
Delaware Supreme Court on interlocutory appeal.231 In a divided
opinion,232 the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed the

223. Id. at 925. Omnicare’s letter to NCS was uncertain because it “was expressly
conditioned on negotiating a merger agreement, obtaining certain third party consents, and
completing its due diligence.” Id. at 924.
224. Id. at 925. A fiduciary-out clause is a “contractual provision . . . that would permit
the board of the corporation being acquired to exit without breaching the merger agreement
in the event of a superior offer.” Id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting).
225. One was the Chairman of the NCS board of directors, and the other was the
President, CEO and a director of NCS. Id. at 919–20.
226. Id. at 925.
227. Id. at 926.
228. Id.
229. See supra notes 224, 226 and accompanying text. The NCS directors were aware
that they had irrevocably bound themselves to the Genesis deal, as NCS’ legal counsel had
advised the board that this deal “would prevent NCS from engaging in any alternative or
superior transaction in the future.” Id. at 924.
230. Plaintiffs filed the fiduciary duty claim in In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders
Litig., 825 A.2d 240 (Del. Ch. 2002).
231. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934. The Delaware Court of Chancery denied the request
for a preliminary injunction in an order dated November 22, 2002, which it revised on
November 25, 2002. See In re NCS Healthcare, 825 A.2d at 263 (in which the preliminary
injunction request was denied). The interlocutory review was in Appeal No. 649, 2002. See
Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920 (relating the procedural history of the case at hand).
232. The en banc Supreme Court was divided in a 3-2 decision. Omnicare, 818 A.2d
914.
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defensive measures of the merger agreement under the Unocal standard233
and held that the deal-protection measures violated Unocal’s second step
since the measures were both preclusive and coercive because no other
proposal could succeed.234 The majority held “alternatively”235 that the
NCS board was required to negotiate a fiduciary-out clause:
“Notwithstanding the corporation’s insolvent condition, the NCS board had
no authority to execute a merger agreement that subsequently prevented it
from effectively discharging its ongoing fiduciary responsibilities.”236
In reaching its decision, the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court
chose to ignore all monitors. After the Court of Chancery237 and all five
justices of the Delaware Supreme Court conceded that the NCS board was
independent and well informed,238 one would expect the majority to defer
to this board.239 The majority, however, gave two reasons to proceed

233. It is questionable whether this case should have been governed by Unocal.
Traditionally, a third-party merger is governed by the business judgment rule. See supra
notes 24–25 (noting that the business judgment rule applies to a merger in which there is no
conflict of interest). In Omnicare, however, the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court
decided that since the lock-up defended NCS, Unocal was applicable. In reaching this
conclusion, the majority of the Delaware Supreme Court ignored that the reason Unocal
requires enhanced business judgment review is because target directors face an inherent
conflict of interest if they defend the corporation from being taken over by a hostile offeror;
the court failed to square that logic with its concession that the NCS directors had no
conflict of any kind in their desire to sell the corporation. Moreover, the board’s enactment
of deal-protection devices was not defensive, but rather proactive, in order to lure Genesis
into a deal. See id. at 943 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting it is “debatable whether Unocal
applies—and we believe that the better rule in this situation is that the business judgment
rule should apply”); Id. at 947 (Steele, J., dissenting) (stating, “[i]n my opinion, Delaware
law mandates deference under the business judgment rule to a board of directors’ decision
that is free from self interest, made with due care and in good faith”). Cf. Gantler v.
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 705 (Del. 2009) (refusing to apply Unocal to the board’s decision
not to pursue a merger opportunity because there was no hostile tender offer or other action
by which court could infer that board acted defensively).
234. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 938.
237. Id. at 925 (noting that “the Court of Chancery determined the minutes reflect that
the directors were fully informed of all material facts relating to the proposed transaction”);
see also id. at 943 (“The overall quality of testimony given by the NCS directors is among
the strongest this court has ever seen. All four NCS directors were deposed, and each
deposition makes manifest the care and attention given to this project by every member of
the board.”); In re NCS Healthcare, Inc., S’holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 260 & n.46 (Del.
Ch. 2002).
238. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940–41 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
opinion adopted the Court of Chancery’s findings that the NCS board fulfilled all of its
fiduciary duties, with dissent noting that “this conclusion is indisputable on this record”).
239. Id. at 949 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“I believe that the absence of a suggestion of selfinterest or lack of care compels a court to defer to what is a business judgment that a court is
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otherwise. First, the majority reasoned that the board’s conduct was both
preclusive and coercive.240 This conclusion, however, did not comport with
its prior holdings that board conduct is draconian only when the board
coerces the shareholder vote;241 no one coerced the NCS controlling
shareholders to execute a voting agreement. Recall that the controlling
shareholders were officers and directors of NCS and thus heavily involved
in the sale of the company; it was their judgment that a sale to Genesis was
the only viable transaction. Thus, the majority failed to defer to a
concededly independent and diligent board for an erroneous reason.
Second, the court held it could not defer to this board because their
agreement lacked a fiduciary out.242 This logic, in essence, did not fault
this particular board’s conduct, but instead announced a new rule of law:
There must always be a fiduciary out. While one can debate the wisdom of
this rule,243 an opinion based solely on this new requirement would have at
least continued the courts’ tradition of deferring to the judgment of
independent and informed directors while faulting this board only for not
complying with a yet-to-be announced rule of law.
Only the most favorable view of the majority’s opinion would agree
with the latter reason for not deferring to the NCS board. The court’s logic
for not deferring to the other two monitors, however, has no support. There
simply is not a better case for trusting the shareholder vote. That vote was
effectively the decision of the majority shareholders to execute the voting
agreement with Genesis. These shareholders, as officers and directors,
were informed; they chose to commit to the merger agreement not because
the board coerced them or tricked them with misleading disclosure, but
solely because their judgment was that a sure deal with Genesis was

not qualified to second guess.”).
240. Id. at 936.
241. See id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (noting that majority incorrectly applied
law regarding a board coercing its stockholders to case at hand, where board took no such
action).
242. Id. at 925.
243. See, e.g., id. at 945 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (commenting on the majority’s
holding that a per se rule requiring a fiduciary out is necessary, and noting “[w]e know of no
authority in our jurisprudence supporting this new rule, and we believe it is unwise and
unwarranted”); id. at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) (“I would not shame the NCS board, which
acted in accordance with every fine instinct that we wish to encourage, by invalidating their
action approving the Genesis merger because they failed to insist upon a fiduciary out. I use
‘shame’ here because the majority finds no breach of loyalty or care but nonetheless
sanctions these directors for their failure to insist upon a fiduciary out as if those directors
had no regard for the effect of their otherwise disinterested, careful decision on others.”);
see also infra notes 255–60 and accompanying text (describing cases that have rejected a
per se requirement for a fiduciary out in a merger agreement).
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preferable to a better deal that might or might not eventuate in the future.244
Thus, unlike cases where courts invalidated the shareholder vote due to the
board’s defective disclosure,245 there cannot be any claim that these
controlling shareholders did not have all the facts. Moreover, the
controlling shareholders obviously had the most at stake financially since
collectively, they owned the majority of shares, and the deal gave both the
majority and the unaffiliated shares the same consideration. As such, they
had no conflict of interest. Thus, the minority votes were meaningless, not
because of improper board conduct or faulty disclosure, but because the
minority shares lacked the power to stop the controlling shareholders from
exercising their votes as they wished.246 Nor was there any finding that the
minority shares, which need information in order to exercise their appraisal
rights, were not given full and fair information. As a result, the court
should have deferred to the shareholder vote, and the minority’s
disagreement, if any, should have been remedied solely through their
appraisal rights.
Similarly, Omnicare is as compelling a case for deference to the
market monitor as is possible. There was no reason for the court to distrust
this market. This was not a conflict transaction. The NCS directors and
controlling shareholders had no agenda other than what was best for NCS.
The board did a thorough and careful market search.247 Search periods
244. Id. at 944 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (reasoning that the controlling shareholders
“were fully informed stockholders. As the NCS controlling stockholders, they made an
informed choice to commit their voting power to the merger”).
245. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (invalidating the shareholder vote on grounds that the
board’s gross negligence negatively affected its disclosure to the shareholders); supra note
156 and accompanying text (noting that the court in Weinberger invalidated the shareholder
vote because the board had not made a full disclosure to the minority shares who had veto
power over the deal).
246. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 944–45 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“The minority
stockholders were deemed to know that when controlling stockholders have 65% of the vote
they can approve a merger without the need for the minority votes. . . . to the extent a
minority stockholder may have felt ‘coerced’ to vote for the merger, which was already a
fait accompli, it was a meaningless coercion—or no coercion at all—because the controlling
votes . . . were already ‘cast.’ . . . there was no meaningful minority stockholder voting
decision to coerce.”); see also Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc., Indus., Inc., C.A. No. 9212,
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 142, at *18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 19, 1990) (reasoning that “a shareholder,
even a majority shareholder, has discretion as to when to sell his stock and to whom”).
247. The undisputed facts reveal that NCS began to explore its options in February of
2000 by retaining a financial advisor that contacted over fifty entities. Omnicare, 818 A.2d
at 920. NCS then hired a different advisor in December of 2000, as NCS’ financial situation
deteriorated. Id. at 921. In the summer of 2001, NCS invited Omnicare to begin
discussions with NCS’ financial advisor; Omnicare submitted a bid that was unsatisfactory
to NCS. Id. In January, 2002, NCS contacted Genesis about a possible deal, while
Omnicare pursued secret discussions with one of NCS’ directors. Id. In June, 2002,
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require end dates,248 particularly given NCS’ dire financial straits: It was
on borrowed time and staring into the abyss of bankruptcy. Despite the
NCS board’s repeated efforts to get Omnicare to the table,249 the market
produced only one bid—Genesis’—in the timeframe set by the NCS board.
As the court in Barkan reasoned, “when it is widely known that some
change of control is in the offing and no rival bids are forthcoming . . . that
fact is supportive of the board’s decision to proceed.”250 Moreover, the
majority paid little heed to Genesis’ role and needs: It was the Genesis
deal that spurred a higher, concrete offer from Omnicare, but the Genesis
deal would not have eventuated without the lock-up.
Given that the facts of Omnicare trip all three monitors and none of
their exceptions or refinements, it is curious that the majority of the
Delaware Supreme Court eschewed these monitors in favor of judicial
review. The court’s disregard of all of the monitors is inexplicable, save
for the following telling comment:
The latitude a board will have in either maintaining or using the
defensive devices it has adopted to protect the merger it approved
will vary according to the degree of benefit or detriment to the
stockholders’ interests that is presented by the value or terms of
the subsequent competing transaction.251
In other words, the majority’s decision can be explained by its
frustration that the board was unable to seize the better deal; by
invalidating the deal-protection devices, the majority of the Delaware
Supreme Court delivered that better option to the NCS shareholders. Little

Genesis made a proposal but insisted on an exclusivity agreement. Id. at 922. NCS and
Genesis continued to negotiate the deal through July of 2002, id. at 923, when Omnicare
resurfaced with a conditional offer. Id. at 924. As Justice Steele in dissent reasoned, “the
NCS board had thoroughly canvassed the market in an attempt to find an acquirer, save the
company, repay creditors and provide some financial benefit to stockholders. They did so in
the face of silence, tepid interest to outright hostility from Omnicare. The only bona fide,
credible merger partner NCS could find during an exhaustive process was Genesis.” Id. at
947.
248. See In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1008–12 (Del. Ch.
2005) (finding board’s decision to accept a deal after an open market check of one year
produced no capable buyers); see also supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text
(regarding additional information about Toys “R” Us).
249. The undisputed facts show that NCS reached out to Omnicare in the summer of
2001, Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 921, sent its financial advisor to meet with Omnicare’s
financial advisor in October of 2001, id., and only in late July of 2002, after Omnicare was
concerned that NCS was negotiating a deal with an Omnicare competitor, did Omnicare
present a proposal to NCS that would have been acceptable to NCS had it not been qualified
by so many conditions. Id. at 924.
250. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989).
251. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 933 (emphasis added).
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time, however, need be spent highlighting the obvious: Courts should not
second-guess any board’s conduct based on a better offer that subsequently
emerges. This is one rationale for the business judgment rule,252 and a
concern quickly blunted after Revlon, where Delaware courts repeatedly
assured boards that they need not have a crystal ball, nor guarantee that
they have secured the best bid.253 In Omnicare, the majority of the
Delaware Supreme Court reneged on that promise. As the Court of
Chancery in Orman v. Cullman commented on Omnicare, “the test would
appear to result in judicial invalidation of negotiated contractual provisions
based on the advantages of hindsight.”254
In sum, all monitors, as well as appraisal rights, were in play in
Omnicare. Had the court deferred to the monitors, the majority would have
decided the case differently. It is important to underscore, however, that
rather than a debate of opinions about whether this board breached its
fiduciary duties, the monitors instead provided concrete facts that would
have supported a contrary outcome.
Moreover, the “market” of judicial opinions has decreed that
Omnicare was wrongly decided. One California court has squarely held
that Omnicare is not the law in California,255 and the Delaware Court of
Chancery has openly criticized Omnicare as “an aberrational departure”
from the traditional view that the critical fact is whether the board acted
reasonably based on all of the facts and circumstances.256 Equally telling is
that the Delaware Court of Chancery has attempted to dilute Omnicare’s
effect on Delaware law. In Openlane, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,257 the
Delaware Court of Chancery held that no fiduciary out was required where
the board agreed to a merger and the controlling shareholders signed
written consents approving the merger the day after the board signed the
agreement, as opposed to before the merger vote, as was the case in
Omnicare. The Delaware Court of Chancery distinguished Omnicare by
252. Supra note 12 (identifying that one rationale for the business judgment rule is to
shield directors from liability when a better deal emerges in the future).
253. See supra note 117 (explaining directors can only attempt to get the best bid, and
will not be liable if a better bid emerges in the future); supra note 126 and accompanying
text (same).
254. C.A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150, at *35 n.98 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004);
see also Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 940 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (“Our jurisprudence
cannot . . . be seen as turning on such ex post felicitous results. Rather, the NCS board’s
good faith decision must be subject to a real-time review of the board action before the
NCS-Genesis merger agreement was entered into.”).
255. Monty v. Leis, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 641, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied, June
15, 2011 (“Omnicare has been criticized even by Delaware courts . . . . We decline to
follow Omnicare.”).
256. Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1016 n.68 (Del. Ch. 2005).
257. No. 6849-VCN, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 156 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
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reasoning that since the shareholder vote was not part of the merger
agreement, the transaction was not a certainty.258 Similarly, the Court of
Chancery in Orman v. Cullman259 granted defendants’ motion for summary
judgment in a merger where plaintiff claimed the board breached its
fiduciary duties. In reasoning that the board had not locked up a deal, the
court distinguished its case from Omnicare on two grounds, neither of
which accurately portrayed that the deal was, realistically, locked up.260
Thus, some opinions from the Delaware Court of Chancery range from
outright criticism of Omnicare to outright evasion of Omnicare’s tentacles.
B. Entire Fairness: Kahn v. Lynch
Kahn v. Lynch Communication System, Inc.261 (Kahn I) is another
outlier case in that the Delaware Supreme Court chose to disregard two
monitors: independent directors and the votes of disinterested shares. As
discussed above,262 Kahn I involved a shareholder’s suit against his
corporation, Lynch, which was acquired by Lynch’s controlling
shareholder, Alcatel U.S.A. Corporation (Alcatel), pursuant to a tender
offer followed by a cash-out merger.263 Plaintiff claimed that Alcatel
breached its fiduciary duties to Lynch and its shareholders by dictating the

258. The Court of Chancery in Openlane was aware that its efforts to distinguish this
case from Omnicare were razor thin, commenting in a footnote that even though there was
no shareholder agreement in the case at hand, since board members owned sixty percent of
the stock, majority approval of the merger the day after the merger agreement was signed
was a “virtual certainty.” Id. at *31 n.48. Furthermore, the Court of Chancery in Openlane
presented another novel way to cabin Omnicare. The court in Openlane contended that
since Omnicare may be read to require a fiduciary out in merger agreements, the world of
hostile bidders was aware that it could bid for a company that had locked up a merger
without a fiduciary-out clause; therefore, the Court of Chancery contended that there was no
reason for the court to grant an injunction unless a better offer emerges. As the Court of
Chancery conceded that such a merger agreement, followed quickly by consents, no doubt
discouraged other suitors, the court lacked a response to its own argument. Id. at *34 n.53.
259. C.A. No. 18039, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 150 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004).
260. The two bases for distinguishing Orman from Omnicare were first, that the board
in Orman retained a fiduciary out, id. at *13 n.42, and second, the unaffiliated shares had
veto power over the deal. Id. at *33 n.92. These two facts, however, convey an incomplete
picture because the shareholders who owned thirty-six percent of the stock agreed to vote
for the deal and against any alternative transaction for eighteen months. As the Court of
Chancery recognized, “It was this deal or nothing, at least for that [eighteen month] period
of time.” Id. at *36 & n.99.
261. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) [Kahn I], aff’d on reh’g, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995)
[Kahn II].
262. See supra text accompanying note 165.
263. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1111.
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terms of the merger, making false disclosures, and paying an unfair price.264
While the Court of Chancery held that Alcatel was a controlling
shareholder,265 and, as such, owed fiduciary duties to Lynch and its
shareholders, the court concluded that Alcatel had not breached those
duties.266 The Delaware Supreme Court agreed that Alcatel was a
controlling shareholder,267 but held that the Court of Chancery had erred in
ruling that plaintiff bore the burden to prove that the merger transaction
was unfair; instead, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the burden of
proving the entire fairness of the merger remained with Alcatel because the
independent committee of directors had been unable to act independently in
light of Alcatel’s coercive behavior.268 As such, the Delaware Supreme
Court remanded to the Court of Chancery for proceedings in accordance
with its opinion.269 Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn I held
that its concerns about the innate power of controlling shareholders would
require the standard of review in any controlling-shareholder merger to
remain entire fairness, with the burden shifting to the plaintiff to prove
unfairness if a committee proves it acted independently and effectively
represented the minority shares.270 On remand, the Delaware Court of
Chancery held that the merger was entirely fair.271 On the second appeal,
the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s holding that
Alcatel satisfied the requirements for entire fairness.272
264. Id.
265. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., C.A. No. 8748, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at
*6–9 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993). Alcatel owned 43.3% of Lynch. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1114.
266. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151. The chancery court
specifically rejected plaintiff’s claim that Alcatel had made insufficient disclosure. Id. at
*22. The Court of Chancery also held that the independent committee had been able to
negotiate at arm’s length with Alcatel. Id. at *13.
267. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1112, 1114.
268. Id. at 1112.
269. Id. at 1121–22.
270. Id. at 1117.
271. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., C.A. No. 8748, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 44, at *6
(Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995); see also Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 83 (recounting the Court of
Chancery’s finding that the merger was entirely fair).
272. Id. In Kahn II, the Delaware Supreme Court ticked off, seriatim, each of
Weinberger’s elements to explain why this transaction, although the product of a coerced
committee, nevertheless was entirely fair. In essence, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn
II reasoned that, “[w]here other economic forces are at work and more likely produced the
decision to sell, as the Court of Chancery determined here, the specter of coercion may not
be deemed material with respect to the transaction as a whole, and will not prevent a finding
of entire fairness.” Id. at 86. Turning to the fair price issue, the Delaware Supreme Court
deferred to the Court of Chancery’s analysis as to why Alcatel had offered a fair price. Id.
at 87–88. Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected plaintiff’s claim that Alcatel
violated its duty of disclosure by omitting to state that it used coercion to get the Lynch
board to agree to the merger price. Id. at 89. The Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed prior
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In Kahn I, the Delaware Supreme Court had two chances to defer to
independent directors—once, in analyzing the conduct of Lynch’s
committee, and a second time, in selecting the standard of review—and
rejected both opportunities. Focusing first on the composition of Lynch’s
committee, both the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of Chancery
agreed that the committee consisted of three independent directors273 and
was well-advised by a prominent law firm, a financial advisor, and an
investment bank.274 The point of dispute between the two courts was
whether Lynch’s special committee had real bargaining power. As the
Delaware Supreme Court explained:
“[T]he performance of the
Independent Committee merits careful judicial scrutiny to determine
whether Alcatel’s demonstrated pattern of domination was effectively
neutralized so that “each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its
bargaining power against the other at arm’s length.”275
The Court of Chancery’s conclusion that the committee had met this
test and negotiated effectively was based on two facts. First, the committee
rejected Alcatel’s proposed deal between Lynch and Celwave Systems,
Inc., a corporation owned by Alcatel.276 Second, when Alcatel withdrew
the Celwave proposal and offered to acquire the fifty-seven percent of

case law that held that defendants need not confess to wrongdoing to avoid a claim that they
omitted material facts. Id. at 89 (citing to Weiss v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., C.A. No. 8811,
1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 94 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989), aff’d, 574 A.2d 264 (Del. 1990)).
Instead, the court held there was no material omission in the proxy materials because “[a]
reasonable minority shareholder of Lynch was under no illusions concerning the leverage
available to Alcatel and its willingness to use it to acquire the minority interest.” Kahn II,
669 A.2d at 89. The court’s holding that there was no disclosure violation was significant,
as it “precludes the award of damages per se, bears directly upon the manner in which
stockholder approval was obtained, and places this case in the category of ‘nonfraudulent
transactions’ in which price may be the preponderant consideration. . . . Although the
merger was not conditioned on a majority of the minority vote, we note that more than 94
percent of the shares were tendered In response to Alcatel’s offer.” Id. As such, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn II rejected plaintiff’s contention that coercion of the
independent committee was either a per se breach of fiduciary duty or required the
conclusion that the merger was not entirely fair. Id.
273. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113 (noting that Alcatel dealt with Lynch’s independent
committee); Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., C.A. No. 8748, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 102, at *1
n.1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1989).
274. Lynch’s special committee received legal advice from the New York law firm,
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, and retained Thomson McKinnon Securities,
Inc., as its financial advisor as well as Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., as its investment banker.
Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113.
275. Id. at 1118 (citing Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983)).
276. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1112-13. Alcatel proposed a combination of Lynch and
Celwave and made clear that Alcatel would not consider any other deal until Lynch first
considered merging with Celwave.

SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE ILLUSION OF ENHANCED REVIEW

5/3/2013 4:15 PM

663

Lynch’s shares that Alcatel did not already own,277 the committee then
rejected three bids from Alcatel and ultimately accepted Alcatel’s fourth
offer.278 While Alcatel accompanied its fourth offer with a threat to engage
in a hostile tender offer if the merger agreement did not eventuate,279 the
Court of Chancery reasoned that the committee was informed and
aggressive, and under no compulsion to reach an agreement.280 The Court
of Chancery contended that the committee reached its decision after it was
advised that the price was fair and there were no other alternatives, given
that Alcatel, as the controlling shareholder, could block any alternative
transaction.281
In contrast, the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn I drew the opposite
inference from these facts. While the Delaware Court of Chancery thought
Lynch’s rejection of the proposed merger with Celwave indicative of the
committee’s independence, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that
Lynch’s concession to Alcatel’s demand that Lynch consider a merger with
Celwave before considering any other merger partner made “the
Independent Committee’s ability to bargain at arm’s length with Alcatel
suspect from the outset.”282 The committee’s ultimate rejection of the
proposed deal with Celwave—a company owned by Alcatel—did not
change the Delaware Supreme Court’s view that the committee’s
consideration of the deal demonstrated that the committee was
compromised. Second, unlike the Court of Chancery, the Delaware
Supreme Court also believed that Alcatel’s threat of a tender offer, if Lynch
did not agree to the merger terms, undermined the committee: The record
reflects that the ability of the Committee effectively to negotiate at arm’s
length was compromised by Alcatel’s threats to proceed with a hostile
tender offer if the $15.50 price was not approved by the Committee and the
Lynch board. The fact that the Independent Committee rejected three
initial offers, which were well below the Independent Committee’s
estimated valuation for Lynch and were not combined with an explicit
threat that Alcatel was “ready to proceed” with a hostile bid, cannot alter
the conclusion that any semblance of arm’s length bargaining ended when
the Independent Committee surrendered to the ultimatum that accompanied
277. Id. at 1113-14.
278. Id. at 1113.
279. Id. at 1119.
280. Id..
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1118. At the August 1, 1986 Lynch board meeting, Alcatel representatives
on Lynch’s board made clear that they opposed consideration of a proposed Lynch-Telco
merger before consideration of a Lynch-Celwave combination. Id. at 1112. At the
conclusion of this same meeting, the Lynch board established an independent committee to
negotiate with Celwave. Id. at 1113.
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Alcatel’s final offer.283 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court refused to defer
to this independent committee.
Although claiming that the committee’s conduct did not meet the
court’s standards for effective negotiations, the Delaware Supreme Court
actually never gave this committee a chance. From the court’s own
statement of facts, Lynch’s full board agreed to consider the Celwave
merger and then appointed a committee to consider this proposed deal.284
Thus, like any board committee, this one had no choice but to follow the
orders of its board,285 and Lynch’s board tasked its committee to consider a
merger with Celwave. The Delaware Supreme Court’s contention,
therefore, that the committee’s consideration of the Celwave merger—a
decision that the board, rather than the committee, made—instead of the
committee’s rejection of the merger, was dispositive, was a fact outside of
the committee’s control. Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court believed
that Alcatel’s threat of a hostile offer that accompanied its fourth offer,
rather than the committee’s rejection of three offers from Alcatel before
agreeing to the final offer, evidenced that the committee was compromised.
The committee, however, could not prevent Alcatel from threatening to
make a hostile offer. Therefore, the only relevant issue was evaluating the
committee’s reaction to Alcatel’s threat: Did the committee’s decision to
accept Alcatel’s fourth offer evidence surrender to this threat, or instead
reflect a business judgment that, although this threat was insubstantial, as a
tender offer would likely face serious difficulties with the fifty-seven
percent of shares not owned by Alcatel if Lynch’s board recommended
rejecting Alcatel’s offer,286 the committee thought it had reached the limits
of its negotiations. Traditionally, Delaware courts would punt on this call,

283. Id. at 1121 (citation omitted). For a case with similar facts that reached a contrary
view see In re Siliconix, Inc., S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 18700, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at
*3-4 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (reasoning that a controlling shareholder two-step freezeout is
not inherently coercive, despite controlling shareholder resorting to a no-premium exchange
offer, after failing to strike a deal with independent committee of directors).
284. See supra note 282 (explaining that the Lynch board established an independent
committee to negotiate with Celwave).
285. The board can delegate most management functions to a board committee. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c)(1)–(2) (2007) (detailing the formation and powers of a
board committee under Delaware corporate law); see also 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE
A FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS §
410[B] (3d ed. 2011). The Lynch board created an independent committee and delegated to
it the power to negotiate with Celwave on behalf of Lynch. See Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113
(detailing the formation of the Lynch independent committee). As such, the committee was
required to follow the instructions of the board.
286. Alcatel owned only 43.3% of Lynch’s outstanding stock, although it had some
additional clout by virtue of a provision in Lynch’s charter that required 80% share approval
for any business combination. Kahn I, 638 A.2d at 1113.
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deferring to the decision of an independent and well-informed committee.
Since both facts on which the Delaware Supreme Court relied were
completely out of the committee’s control, this committee could not win.
Once the committee received orders from its board of directors to consider
the Celwave merger, and once Alcatel uttered the words that it would
consider resorting to a hostile tender offer, this committee could no longer
prove its independence to the Delaware Supreme Court. Thus, no
deference was possible, as the court based its decision not on the
committee’s conduct, but on what others did and said.
Given that case law states that courts will defer to independent
committees who have demonstrated real negotiating power, and given that
the court did not give this committee any chance to earn that deference, one
suspects that the court’s real concern was the power of a controlling
shareholder to undermine the process in a controlling-shareholder
transaction. The Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn I, however, had the
opportunity to incorporate these concerns into its standard of review, and
did, in fact, seize that opportunity, by holding that entire fairness will
remain the standard of review in any controlling-shareholder merger.287
Therefore, by keeping the monitor as entire fairness, the court already
anointed itself the ultimate arbiter of whether a controlling-shareholder
merger is entirely fair. As such, the court could have deferred to this
independent and well-informed committee and shifted the burden to
plaintiff to prove that the transaction was unfair, while still retaining the
power to scrutinize the conduct of this controlling shareholder.
Similarly, the court could have deferred to Lynch’s shareholders. It is
noteworthy that ninety-four percent of Lynch’s disinterested shares
tendered their stock to Alcatel in its two-step tender offer/merger offer.288
While technically not voting, shareholders in a tender offer are choosing to
express their “vote” by selling their shares.289 Although the court in Kahn I
did not mention this shareholder support for the Alcatel transaction, the

287. Id. at 1116 (“Entire fairness remains the proper focus of judicial analysis in
examining an interested merger, irrespective of whether the burden of proof remains upon or
is shifted away from the controlling or dominating shareholder, because the unchanging
nature of the underlying ‘interested’ transaction requires careful scrutiny.”). Prior to Kahn I,
the issue was open about whether a successful independent committee would shift the
standard of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule. Id. at 1115 (noting
that the lower court had identified different views on whether approval by an independent
committee would change the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment
rule).
288. Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 89.
289. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc., S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445 (Del. Ch. 2002)
(viewing shareholders’ selling of their stock akin to voting for purposes of establishing
criteria for a controlling-shareholder tender offer to avoid being classified as coercive).

SIEGEL - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

666

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/3/2013 4:15 PM

[Vol. 15:3

court in Kahn II used this support as one factor in ultimately holding that
the merger was entirely fair.290
As with Omnicare,291 the “market” of cases has deemed Kahn’s choice
of the entire fairness standard wrong. As discussed above,292 cases like In
re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation293 and In re CNX Gas
Corp. Shareholders Litigation294 have attempted to change the standard of
review in controlling-shareholder freezeout transactions from entire
fairness to the business judgment rule by identifying conditions under
which courts can comfortably defer to the director and shareholder
monitors.295 It is particularly important to underscore that the Court of
Chancery agrees with the Delaware Supreme Court about the capacity of a
controlling shareholder to overreach;296 their disagreement with the logic of
Kahn is purely based on their faith in the external monitors. For example,

290. Kahn II, 669 A.2d at 89; see also supra note 272 (discussing other factors
supporting the court’s holding).
291. See supra notes 255–60 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
293. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) (finding that in the context of a voluntary tender or
exchange offer, Delaware law does not recognize the ability of shareholders to receive a
particular price, and therefore, entire fairness is not the standard of review; the touchstone is
the presence of “voluntariness,” to which that court looks at factors such as (1) whether
coercion is present or (2) whether materially false or misleading disclosures were made to
shareholders in connection with the offer; if the court finds the offer voluntary, then the
controlling shareholder does not have a duty to prove the entire fairness of the transaction,
and the court will defer to the board of directors as required under the business judgment
rule).
294. 4 A.3d 397, 412 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that the business judgment rule should
apply to freeze-out transactions that mirror the elements of an arm’s length merger); see In
re CNX Gas. Corp. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 5377-VCL, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139 (Del.
Ch. July 5, 2010) (finding that the Court of Chancery’s application of the business judgment
rule raised a sufficient conflict within Delaware case law that was appropriate for review by
the Supreme Court), certifying questions to 30 A.3d 782 (Del. 2010).
295. Other Delaware cases have similarly sought to distance themselves from the
holding in Kahn by differentiating the facts based on the role of the controlling shareholder.
See, e.g., In re John Q Hammons Hotels Inc., S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 758-CC, 2009 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009) (distinguishing from Kahn because an unrelated
third party, rather than controlling shareholder, made the offer to minority stockholders); see
also Allen et al., supra note 2, at 1307–08 (recognizing that while there may be legitimate
hesitancy in changing the standard of review based on the approval of an independent
committee of directors, there is no basis for such hesitancy if there is a fully informed and
uncoerced vote by disinterested shares).
296. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 444 (noting that the “preferable policy choice” is to
provide flexibility while recognizing the “inherent coercion” in controlling-shareholder
transactions); In re CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d at 415 (agreeing that a controlling shareholder
has the ability to overreach, and characterizing such power as “the ability to use its voting
power to remove and replace incumbent directors and, if it wishes, force through its chosen
transaction via [a] merger”).
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the Court of Chancery in Pure Resources directly highlighted the
inconsistency of Kahn’s view that independent directors could be so
intimidated, which is “premised on a less trusting view of independent
directors than is reflected in the important case of Aronson v. Lewis . . .
which presumed that a majority of independent directors can impartially
decide whether to sue a controlling stockholder.”297 Similarly, in CNX, the
Court of Chancery summarized other Delaware Court of Chancery cases
that have greater faith in the monitors than does Kahn: “It bears noting that
the Injunction Decision, Cox Communications, and the Pure Resources line
of cases implicitly conflict with Lynch by holding that a combination of
protective devices can compensate sufficiently for inherent coercion so as
to alter the standard of review.”298 Furthermore, in order to demonstrate the
efficacy of the external monitors, the Court of Chancery in CNX cited
numerous examples of independent committees and disinterested shares
that had the backbone to rebuff a controlling-shareholder transaction and
concluded:
Post-Lynch experience shows that special committees can
negotiate effectively with controllers and that both special
committees and minority stockholders can reject squeeze-out
proposals . . . . These examples augur in favor of a unified
standard under which independent directors and unaffiliated
stockholders are given the tools to negotiate with controllers,
backstopped by meaningful judicial review for fairness when
those tools are withheld.299
Thus, these Court of Chancery opinions agree with the concerns articulated
297. In re Pure Res., 808 A.2d at 436 n.17.
298. In re CNX Gas Corp., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *26–27.
299. In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., 4 A.3d at 413–14 (emphasis added). The
court described the specific examples:
I am currently presiding over a challenge to a controlling transaction in which
the majority-of-the-minority tender condition failed twice. See Revlon, 990
A.2d at 957. Last fall the directors of iBasis adopted a rights plan in response to
a tender offer by its controlling stockholder, Royal KPN. The iBasis directors
filed two lawsuits against Royal KPN, took one of the lawsuits through trial,
and ultimately extracted a price increase from $2.25 to $3 per share. In 2005,
minority stockholders at Cablevision Systems Corporation rejected a going
private transaction proposed by the Dolan family, which controlled 74% of the
company’s voting power, despite its 51% premium over market. In 2003, the
outside directors of Next Level Communications, Inc. resisted a Siliconix tender
offer and filed suit against the controlling stockholder to enjoin the transaction.
Next Level, 834 A.2d at 846-47. In Siliconix itself, the exchange offer that was
the subject of the decision ultimately failed to satisfy its majority-of-theminority condition.
Id. at 413.
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in Kahn I that the controlling shareholder can overreach, but do not agree
with the view in Kahn I that judges, rather than fully-functioning external
monitors, are the best arbiter. As the court in In re CNX Gas Corporation
contended, Kahn “de-emphasized market forces . . . and relies heavily on
judicial review.”300
In sum, these outlier cases are interesting because the court in each
case suspended its traditional reliance on the external monitors. As such,
adding the external monitors to the analysis does more than present a
different view of whether the Omnicare board breached its fiduciary duties,
or who should have had the burden of proof in Kahn, and what should be
the standard of review in a controlling-shareholder merger; the monitors
also provide objective facts on which to ground a decision. As Omnicare
and Kahn illustrate, when courts disregard the external monitors, judges
delegitimize their opinions by pinning their decisions on inferences and
suspect economics.
CONCLUSION
This Article has exposed that while judges say that they will defer to
the board only under the business judgment rule, such deference is quite
widespread in other tests as well. Delaware courts have worked hard to
develop the contours of the external monitors so that courts can
comfortably defer to an independent board or committee, disinterested
share votes that are informed and not coerced, and a reliable market.
Particularly when more than one fully-functioning monitor is active, these
monitors present a formidable reason for courts not to intervene.
Moreover, even though judges from the Delaware Court of Chancery agree
that a controlling shareholder has the capacity to overreach, they have
attempted to change the standard of review in controlling-shareholder cases
to further rely on these monitors. The courts’ strong support for fullyfunctioning monitors is invaluable information for transactional and
litigation lawyers. This information is, however, also useful to judges, who
can supplant otherwise intellectually-shaky decisions based solely on their
own instincts, with strong grounding based on information derived from the
external monitors.

300. In re CNX Gas Corp., 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *42.

